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A STUDY IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RITUALISM

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND
LITERATURE IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

(DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY)

BY

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
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PART I

THE CEREMONY

"L'ordre du monde depend de l'ordre des rites qu'on observe."

—RENAN, *Le Prêtre de Nemi*.

CHAPTER I

DESCRIPTION OF THE CEREMONY

Religious and moral problems have never been more assiduously and faithfully studied than they are today. On the one hand are the conservative theologians who are bending every effort to keep intact the dogmas and traditions of Christianity. The welfare of humanity, they think, depends upon doing this. On the other hand are the scientists, motivated not by a spirit of opposition but by an earnest desire to get hold of the truth. Truth, they hold, cannot permanently injure humanity. Any light that anthropology, psychology, archaeology, or any other line of research can throw on questions of religion and morality should be welcomed. Scientific research should be encouraged.

A central problem of religion and morality, and one to which comparatively little attention has been given, is ritualism. The object of the present undertaking is a critical study from the point of view of the psychology of religion and social psychology of this type of reaction, for the purpose of describing the laws of its origin, development, and survival. The thesis which we shall defend is that the type of reaction designated as ritualism is always social, that it is performed to mediate practical control, and that it has a natural history in accordance with well-known psychological laws. It is, of course, impossible to examine every ceremony past and present, nor is it necessary, for we are interested less in morphological classification than in psychological function. Modern scholars now generally recognize that all available historical and contemporary data point to the fact that, notwithstanding the differences in the stages of culture among men, the structure of mind and the laws of mental development are essentially the same wherever man is found. The similarity in rituals and objects of worship among primitive peoples separated far in time and space has long been one of the conspicuous phenomena of the history of religion and is in striking confirmation of the above.

In view of this now generally recognized law, we can find no better starting-point for our study than the description of a few typical ceremonies. The monumental works of Spencer and Gil-

len,¹ and A. W. Howitt² contain an abundance of excellent descriptive material relative to the rites and ceremonies of the Blacks of Australia, any of which might serve our purpose. As, however, the Intichiuma ceremonies are of special importance to the natives of the central part of the continent and are extremely suggestive, we first turn our attention to them.

The purpose of these ceremonies³ is the increase of the totem objects. As the totem objects are plants and animals, to which are added wind, sun, water, and clouds, it is plain that a substantial increase of the food supply is the real end sought. The ceremonies of no two totem groups are alike, for reasons that appear later, but through all there runs the common purpose as indicated. Here we have the key to the situation. The climate of Central Australia is exceedingly hot and dry. There are long-continued times of drought, when the food supply is at a minimum.⁴ Moreover, the dry season is of uncertain length, and the rainy one often of irregular occurrence. At such times the scarcity of food becomes a serious problem for the savages. It is, then, not at all surprising to learn that many of the totem groups perform the Intichiuma ceremony just about when they look for a good season.⁵ That is the time when rations are lowest and when they have reason to believe that magic will be most effective. The ceremony is presided over by the Alatumja or headman of the group,⁶ who is obliged to eat a little of the totem so that he may be able to perform the ceremony with success. The members of the totem group "eat only sparingly of their totemic animal,"⁷ or plant, a strict man eating none at all. The rest they hand "to the other men who do not belong to the totem, giving them permission to eat it freely."

Spencer and Gillen describe the Intichiuma of the Unjiamba or Hakea Flower Totem as follows:

¹ Spencer and Gillen, (1) *The Native Tribes of Central Australia* (London, 1899); (2) *The Northern Tribes of Central Australia* (London, 1904).

² A. W. Howitt, *The Native Tribes of South-east Australia* (London, 1904).

³ *Vide* Spencer and Gillen, *The Native Tribes of Central Australia*, pp. 167-211; and *The Northern Tribes of Central Australia*, pp. 283-319.

⁴ *The Native Tribes of South-east Australia*, pp. 38 and 155.

⁵ *The Native Tribes of Central Australia*, p. 170.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 9 f.

⁷ *The Northern Tribes of Central Australia*, pp. 184 f.

At a place called Ilyaba the ceremony is performed by men of the Bulthara and Panunga classes, and the exact spot at which it takes place is a shallow, oval-shaped pit, by the side of which grows an ancient Hakea tree. In the center of the depression is a small projecting and much worn block of stone, which is supposed to represent a mass of Unjiamba or Hakea flowers, the tree being the *Nanja* tree of an Alcheringa woman whose reincarnation is now alive.

Before the ceremony commences the pit is carefully swept clean by an old Unjiamba man, who then strokes the stone all over with his hands. When this has been done the men sit around the stone and a considerable time is spent in singing chants, the burden of which is a reiterated invitation to the Unjiamba tree to flower much, and to the blossoms to be full of honey. Then the old leader asks one of the young men to open a vein in his arm, which he does, and allows the blood to sprinkle freely over the stone, while the other men continue the singing. The blood flows until the stone is completely covered, the flowing blood being supposed to represent the preparation of *Abmoara*, that is, the drink which is made by steeping the flowers in water, this being a very favorite beverage of the natives. As soon as the stone is covered with blood the ceremony is complete.*

The determining impulse in this ceremony is food. The specific reference is the favorite Hakea flower beverage. The things that are conspicuous are the movements and the accompanying chant. The movements are not mere random movements. They are designed to represent actual situations in the life of the natives, "the flowing of the blood being supposed to represent the preparation of the beverage"; or they are the expression of attitudes, as when Hakea-Flower-Totem old man strokes the stone with his hands. This "stone is regarded as a churinga and the spot is . . . forbidden to the women, children, and uninitiated men." As the Central Australians have nothing more sacred than their churinga, it is not surprising that emotion should appear when they are handled.⁹ The accompanying chants indicate that the participants view the Unjiamba tree as a social rather than a physical object. They speak directly to the tree itself, making definite petition for what they want. The ceremony has reference to the everyday

* *The Native Tribes of Central Australia*, pp. 184 f.

⁹ "Churinga is the name given by the Arunta natives to certain sacred objects which, on penalty of death or very severe punishment, such as blinding by means of a fire stick, are never allowed to be seen by women or uninitiated men." The churinga are one and all connected with the totems and may not be seen except upon very rare occasions (*The Native Tribes of Central Australia*, chap. v).

life of the natives. The situation is not merely a product of the imagination, but an attempt at a type of control that from the primitive point of view is perfectly rational.

In addition to the movements and accompanying myth, chants, or prayer, the element of decoration is very conspicuous in many primitive ceremonies. The Zuni ceremony called Hláhewe Ceremony for Rain,¹⁰ in which the personators of the corn maidens wear a headdress with a tablet ornamented with cloud, sun, crescent, and star symbols, displays this trait, as does the Intichiuma ceremony of the Emu Totem of the Arunta tribe. In the instance of the latter, the Alatunja and his two sons saturate a patch of ground, covering about three square yards with blood from a vein in their arms. The blood dries and leaves a hard surface. On this a totemic design is painted.

It is supposed to represent certain parts of the emu; two large patches of yellow indicate lumps of fat, of which the natives are very fond, but the greater part represented, by means of circles and circular patches, the eggs in various stages of development, some before and some after laying. Small circular yellow patches represented the small eggs in the ovary; a black patch surrounded by a black circle was a fully-formed egg ready to be laid; while two large concentric circles meant an egg which has been laid and incubated, so that a chicken has been formed. In addition to these marks, various sinuous lines drawn in black, red and yellow, indicate parts of the intestines, the excrements being represented by black dots. Everywhere over the surface, in and amongst the various drawings, white spots indicated the feathers of the bird, the whole device being enclosed by a thin line of pale pink down.¹¹

The decorations, like the movements in the ceremony, commonly deal with things and situations in the lives of the natives themselves. In their simplest form the decorations are an attempt to reproduce concrete situations, as when the decoration of the Emu Totem represents the emu.¹² Often, however, as in the illustration above, the design is largely of a conventional pattern. The meaning in such cases is well known to the natives participating.

The movements and the decorations usually belong together. Besides reproducing actual situations from life (as when, in the case of the Plumbtree Totem, one man knocks off imaginary plums

¹⁰ Mathilda Coxé Stevenson, "The Zuni Indians," *Twenty-third Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology*, pp. 180-204.

¹¹ *The Native Tribes of Central Australia*, pp. 179 f.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 343.

and another eats them), the movements are often designed to give a dramatic representation of the movements of totemic animals. In the lizard ceremony a man decorated to represent a lizard comes up to the ceremony ground slowly in a zig-zag course, stooping down and assuming a variety of attitudes.¹³ In the ceremony of the Fish Totem of Uratinga, the performer is decorated to represent a fish. Squatting on the ground, he moves his body and extends his arms, opening and closing them as he leans forward "so as to imitate a fish swelling itself out and opening and closing its gills."¹⁴ Here we have an indication (many other examples could be cited) that a certain type of decoration implies a corresponding type of motion, and vice versa.

Let it not be inferred, however, that the types of movements and decorations above enumerated are always the only ones present. It would indeed be absurd to expect only these. I have already referred to movements which produce various types of emotion. Handling and stroking the *churinga* is manifestly one of these. Then there is often much dancing, often also a swaying motion, both of which, if carried to excess, are favorable to sensory and motor automatisms—experiences that doubtless have had a determining influence in the construction of primitive man's world.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 304.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 317.

CHAPTER II

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF RITUALISM

A rite or ceremony is the observance of some formal act or series of acts in the manner prescribed by custom or authority, and from the point of view of functional psychology must be considered as a type of overt reaction performed for the purpose of control. In the case of the Intichiuma ceremony described in the last chapter, the purpose is control of the food situation. The totemic ceremonies described constitute a part of the initiation ceremonies¹ in the Arunta tribe, and are intimately connected with matters of sex and social organization. As designed for control, the ceremony has subjective and objective aspects. Both are invariably present, though often in varying degrees.

This brings us to a consideration of first importance. The ceremony is always a social reaction. There is always implicit or explicit reference to other selves, be they real or imagined. To divide rites into communal and personal² is to distinguish on a superficial basis. Even such a supposedly individual rite as that of naming the child always implies a relation to others. The name is given by others. It is given to mark the child as a member of a certain group, to distinguish it from other members of the group, to designate its relation to society at large, and last but not least, to insure more adequate control of the individual by the group. Thus viewed, this rite, which Brinton catalogues under "personal" rites, naturally comes to take its place as a communal rite. It certainly would be quite as much

¹ A. W. Howitt has a significant paragraph on the initiation ceremonies. Though his words have immediate reference to the natives of Southeast Australia, they apply equally well to Central Australia. "The intention of all that is done at this ceremony is to make a momentous change in the boy's life; the past is to be cut off from him by a gulf which he can never repass. His connection with his mother as her child is broken off, and he becomes henceforth attached to the men. . . . He is now to be a man, instructed in and sensible of the duties which devolve upon him as a member of the . . . community. . . . The ceremonies are intended to impress and terrify the boy in such a manner that the lesson may be indelible, and may govern the whole of his future life."—*The Native Tribes of South-east Australia*, p. 532.

² Daniel G. Brinton, *Religions of Primitive Peoples* (New York, 1897), pp. 177 f.

so as sacrifice, which he calls a communal rite; for here the individual may have done nothing more than make himself unclean,³ and be sacrificing to remove the uncleanness.

The position which I shall defend in the present undertaking is that every ceremony, every rite, is social. It is social because of several considerations. The first has already been indicated; viz., that as an overt type of reaction it invariably has reference—implied or explicit—to other selves. There is no rite in the history of religion in which an individual participates alone without any reference to other selves, lower, co-ordinate, or higher. In the second place, the various ceremonies are overt reactions out of a matrix which is nothing more or less than the social consciousness. It is, for instance, as absurd to suppose that the god who is propitiated by the savage or barbarian is other than he is conceived by the savage himself, as it is to suppose that the prayer of the child is addressed to a being other than the one with whom it places itself into relation. "O God, isn't it nice to ride in the cable car! Please send me a bicycle. Amen," prayed the little child.⁴ We may without hesitation say that many of primitive man's ceremonies contain elements as spontaneous as this prayer of the little child. In the third place, the ceremony, whatever its origin may have been in the past, is for the worshiper or immediate participant an institution originated and prescribed by some other self—usually a god or ancestor: if by a god, there is an accompanying myth of the occasion of the revelation, as in the case of the Hebrews; if by an ancestor, it is believed to have been handed down through tradition, as among the Central Australians. In either case its origin is social.

In addition to the social aspect, we need, in the second place, to illuminate more fully the practical character of the ritual to which some reference has already been made. From a higher stage of culture we are apt to look upon these ceremonies as so much nonsense and waste of good energy. But we should not forget that some things in vogue in our own stage of culture scarcely a century ago appear thus to us today. When we place the first type of locomotive manufactured beside one of the colossal freight or passenger engines of the present day, the former looks like a toy

³ Num., chap. 19.

⁴ George A. Coe, *Education in Religion and Morals* (New York, 1904), p. 168 (footnote).

in the presence of the latter. Likewise, when we compare the ceremonies of primitive man with our modern scientific methods of control, the former appear like so much play. But even as the first locomotive, impractical as it may be today, grew out of practical demands, so the ritual has been an instrument of practical control. Wherever a comparatively primitive type of ritual survives in higher stages of culture, the social consciousness back of it still finds it a practical method of control.

We may here note the fact that in primitive society the ritual refers to every act of life. In 1887 and 1888 about six hundred sacred formulas were obtained on the Cherokee reservation in North Carolina. They cover "every subject pertaining to the daily life and thought of the Indian, including medicine, love, hunting, fishing, war, self-protection, destruction of enemies, witchcraft, the crops, the council, the ball play, etc., and in fact embodying almost the whole of the ancient religion of the Cherokees."⁵ This is excellent evidence in favor of the practical character of the ritual. The Todas afford an example of how an elaborate ritual can grow up about the chief concern of everyday life. These primitive people gain almost their entire livelihood from the products of the dairy. The large part of their ritual is concerned with the dairy, dairymen, and buffaloes.⁶ Again, if our theory of the practical character of the ritual is correct, it would be reasonable to expect that in a hot, arid climate where the rainy season is followed by long dry spells, there would be ceremonies for the purpose of securing rain and increasing the food supply. These are precisely the conditions actually existing in Central Australia and in New Mexico and Arizona; and, what is more, as we have noted, both the natives of Central Australia and the Amerinds of New Mexico have elaborate rituals to cover these conditions. The matter of social organization or government is also of intense practical interest from the point of view of sex, and becomes one of the first considerations in a large number of totemic ceremonies. Thus, we may go the round of what would rightly come to be matters of practical importance for primitive man—birth, death, sickness, food, social organization, sex, and so forth—and find that all are represented by elaborate rituals.

⁵ James Mooney, "The Sacred Formulas of the Cherokees," *Seventh Annual Report of the Bureau of Ethnology* (Washington, 1891), p. 307.

⁶ W. H. R. Rivers, *The Todas* (London, 1906), pp. 38 f.

In the third place, rites and ceremonies, from imitative magic to baptism as it is practiced in the Christian church in our day, are symptomatic. They are the overt expression of subjective states. Attitudes, imaginations, ideas, emotions, all are manifested in multitudinous form, and in the most diverse ways in ceremonial practices. As by the pulse, temperature, and other symptoms the skilful physician is able to diagnose the physical condition of his patient, thus the trained psychologist is prepared from the ceremonial practices of the group to estimate its stage of culture and describe its social consciousness. The point that needs special emphasis is that the ceremony is in no wise imposed from without by some higher power. The thus-saith-the-Lord of the mystical experience of the great leader, prophet, or apostle, at the base of the ceremony, is at most no more than an excellent indication of the interlocutory nature of consciousness⁷ or of the sudden incursion of material from the fringe into the focus of attention.⁸ The complex system of ceremonial observances laid down in the Pentateuch, believed by many to have been received by Moses direct from Jahwe, is now known to be in substantial harmony with practices of surrounding peoples. Archaeological research, especially the discovery of the Code of Hammurabi, as well as careful study of contemporary savage practices, has done much to bring about a realization of the fact that even these rites reflect the social consciousness of the group concerned.

A specific question will perhaps serve to bring into better perspective the symptomatic character of the ceremonial practices. What is the belief of the Chinese regarding the dead? There are a number of ways in which one presumably might be able to procure an answer to that question. But there is none better than to study the ceremonial practices of the Chinese performed for their dead. The writer has had opportunity to do this during his residence among the Chinese, and does not hesitate to say that the Chinese of Central China believe that each man has at least three souls which survive death. One is thought to frequent the grave. This is easily gathered from the fact that chickens, pigs, etc., are sacrificed at the grave on the appointed day in the spring, and from

⁷ Cf. Anna Louise Strong, *A Consideration of Prayer from the Standpoint of Social Psychology* (Chicago, 1908), p. 17. ~

⁸ William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (New York, 1909), pp. 193 and 234.

the little opening left in many graves with the almost imperceptible soul-path leading from it. The second soul is supposed to remain in the home—more specifically in the ancestral tablet. This I have concluded from the fact of worship in front of the tablet, and this has been further substantiated by a most weird phenomenon. Just at dusk a woman will step out of the front door of the house, and with a mournful, wailing call invite the wandering soul back into the home. The third soul is believed to have gone into the world of spirits. In evidence of this it is customary for the Chinese to burn up hundreds of thousands of supposed hundred-cash bills. The smoke is thought to carry the money into the other world. I have also witnessed a like performance in the case of a house constructed of various colors of paper, and fitted out with the conveniences of the Chinese home made of similar material.

Ritual expresses in the form of overt reactions the relation between the participant and certain other selves involved in the ceremony. In the event that the social consciousness is characterized by the naïveté of animism, the ceremony will be symptomatic of that condition. If the social consciousness is marked by a fearful attitude toward a god whose dignity is outraged on the slightest occasion, the ritual will include a well-developed piacular ceremony. On the other hand, where the sacrifice partakes of the nature of feasting and merry-making, as among the early Semites, Greeks, and Romans,⁹ it is a certain indication that the attitude of the group toward its god, ancestor, or totem is that of confidence and fellowship. Naïveté in the ceremony and naïveté of subjective states go together. Storm and stress without indicate storm and stress within. The inner and outer are mutually determining. This is a point of first importance in studying the ceremony.

A fourth feature of ritualism deserving special attention is its symbolic character. As a symbol the ceremony "stands for something, which, in itself, it is not."¹⁰ Though there is a growing tendency to seek for aesthetic effect in connection with practical aspects, yet there is this general correspondence between ceremonies of cultured society and those of primitive man, that neither are as a rule performed for the mere sake of the ceremonies themselves.

⁹ W. Robertson Smith, *The Religion of the Semites* (London, 1901), pp. 255 ff.

¹⁰ Charles Hubbard Judd, *Psychology*, p. 256.

A meaning is usually implied—a meaning that is to be conveyed to somebody for some definite purpose. Here again the social character of the reaction comes to the surface. The meaning is not always apparent to the superficial observer or to the uninitiated, but it is there nevertheless. "Men have always argued," writes Andrew Lang,¹¹ "like one of the persons in M. Renan's play *Le Prêtre de Nemi*, that 'l'ordre du monde depend de l'ordre des rites qu'on observe.'" This is a hyperbolic statement, and yet so far as primitive man is concerned it is very near the truth. "In our day the domain of ritual is restricted, but in primitive culture it pervades the whole life. Not a single action of any importance can be performed that is not accompanied by prescribed rites of more or less elaborate form."¹² Among the Navajos, for instance, the shaman, when the house-dedication song is sung, "listens closely to hear whether the correct words are sung. This is a matter of great importance, as the omission of a part of the song or the incorrect rendering of any word would entail evil consequences to the house and its inmates."¹³ A similar state of affairs as to the care with which the prescribed ritual had to be carried out has prevailed in India since the simpler and more spontaneous worship represented by the Rig Veda was supplemented by the elaborate ritual of the Brahmanas. It is true that there is a great diversity in the nature of the various rituals and the amount of symbolism involved, but a degree of symbolism is usually not far from the surface.

The ceremony may be performed because the participant wants something that cannot be obtained through the means ordinarily at his disposal (the type of behavior designated by James H. Leuba as "mechanical"),¹⁴ or because he wishes to perform the act without being directly implicated in the overt result. The ceremony in this way becomes a method of transmitting the wishes and desires of the individual or group concerned to the power which is to bring about the results. It is not necessary that this power be sharply defined. Sometimes it is and sometimes it is not, as

¹¹ Andrew Lang, *Myth, Ritual and Religion* (London, 1887), I, 260.

¹² Franz Boas, "Some Traits of Primitive Culture," *Journal of American Folk-Lore*, XVII, 250.

¹³ Cosmos Mindeleff, "Navaho Houses" (Ceremonies of Dedication), *Seventeenth Annual Report of Bureau of American Ethnology*, Part 2, p. 506.

¹⁴ James H. Leuba, *The Psychological Origin and the Nature of Religion* (Chicago, 1909).

in case of the Hakea tree in the ceremony described in the last chapter. The point I wish to emphasize is that the ceremony often is designed to influence a higher power which is to help if approached in the right way.

A description of a ceremony taken from the charm book of a Langat Malay will serve to illustrate this point:

You make an image to resemble a corpse out of wax from an empty bees' comb and of the length of a footstep. If you want to cause sickness, you pierce the eye and blindness results; or you pierce the waist and the stomach gets sick, or you pierce the head and the head gets sick, or you pierce the breast and the breast gets sick. If you want to cause death, you transfix it from the head right through to the buttocks, the "transfixers" being a *gomuti*-palm; then you enshroud the image as you would a corpse, and you pray over it as if you were praying over the dead; then you bury it in the middle of the path [which goes to] the place of the person whom you wish to charm, so that he may step across it.¹⁵

It is a striking fact that the ceremonies of primitive man are almost invariably dramatic representations. Evidently language is often thought to be an inadequate conveyance of meaning. Fearing that the gods or powers concerned might fail to understand, primitive man acts what he wishes to convey, or represents it by drawings on the ground, or sacrifices it on the altar.¹⁶ When we consider

¹⁵ Walter William Skeat, *Malay Magic* (London, 1900), pp. 570 f. When the image is buried the following charm is repeated:

"Peace be to you! Ho Prophet 'Tap, in whose charge the earth is,
Lo, I am burying the corpse of *Somebody*.
I am bidden [to do so] by the Prophet Muhammed
Because he [the corpse] was a rebel to God.
Do you assist in killing him or making him sick:
If you do not make him sick, if you do not kill him,
You shall be a rebel against God;
A rebel against Muhammed.
It is not I who am burying him,
It is Gabriel who is burying him.
Do you too grant my prayer and petition, this very day that appeared,
Grant it by the grace of my petition within the fold of the Creed.
La ilaha," etc.

¹⁶ The following observation is made on this point by Fewkes: "In the growth of religion it was early recognized that the gods had their own language and that possibly they were unable to understand that of men; hence, as has been shown by Powell, there arose and developed a religious gesture language or an expression of prayer by dramatization. The worshipper in this type of

that the language of primitive man is often of necessity supplemented by pantomimicry in his intercourse with his fellows because of its inadequacy, this is not surprising.¹⁷

But the symbolism of the ceremonies often has another aspect. They symbolize certain group values. The initiation ceremonies of the Australians, Bushmen, and many other primitive peoples are of this nature. Circumcision, subincision, knocking out of teeth, instruction by the elders of the tribe, corroborees, and other ceremonies symbolize the attainment of real manhood. In the instance of the Australians, the boys live in the women's camp before their initiation, but afterward are at home in the men's camp.¹⁸ Spencer and Gillen also found initiation ceremonies of women in vogue in Central Australia.¹⁹ Rites of lustration and sacrifice are also cases in point. All have a peculiar value for the participant, not alone in what the rites themselves are, but in what they symbolize.

We have referred to the dramatic representations as being designed to convey the wishes and desires of the group to the higher power. This is, however, not the only symbolic significance they may have. They often refer to the sacred history of the tribe. The Intichiuma (ceremony) of the Witchetty-grub of the Arunta tribes of Alice Springs, Central Australia, is a case in point. "The men assemble in camp, and, leaving everything behind them, . . . they walk in single file to a spot, now called the Emily Gap. . . . This place is especially associated with the Alcheringa ancestors of the group and on its walls are the sacred drawings characteristic of the totem."²⁰ After certain additional ceremonies have been performed and other sacred spots carefully examined, "they march back to camp following precisely the track which, according to tradition, was followed by their Alcheringa ancestors."²¹ The Alatunja or leader of the ceremony is supposed

prayer, which may be called dramatic prayer, showed the gods through action what he desired."—Jesse Walter Fewkes, "Notes on Tusayan Snake and Flute Ceremonies," *Nineteenth Annual Report of Bureau of American Ethnology*, p. 1010.

¹⁷ Both mimicry and pantomimicry also serve as an outlet of attitudes. I have often found pleasure in watching two Chinese make a bargain. Mimicry and pantomimicry play a very important part.

¹⁸ Spencer and Gillen, *The Northern Tribes of Central Australia*, p. 338.

¹⁹ Spencer and Gillen, *The Native Tribes of Central Australia*, pp. 92 f.

²⁰ Spencer and Gillen, *The Northern Tribes of Central Australia*, pp. 289 f.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 290.

to do what the celebrated *Intwailiuka* or great leader of the Witchetty-grubs in the Alcheringa did. If we turn to the North American Indians, dramatic representations of sacred history are equally in evidence. Masked or costumed personages "enact the part of divine beings whose history is recounted in the myth." This presentation of sacred history is, however, "usually of a conventional character so that the symbolism is apparent only to the initiated."²² The conventional character of the rite is, if anything, more pronounced in higher stages of culture. The splendid and highly conventional ritual of the Catholic church, called High Mass, is a dramatic representation of the supper in the house of Simon, and the Passion itself.²³ The Lord's Supper, under the doctrine of transubstantiation of the Catholic church as well as according to the tenets of the Protestant churches, is highly symbolical.

If the conclusions we have reached with reference to the symbolism involved in rites and ceremonies are correct, they show not only a vivid imagination but often also the power of abstraction on the part of the intelligent participants. That is to say, the method of control is not as inane as it appears on the surface. Primitive man reasons from analogy, and while this method falls far short of securing the control of scientific thought, it does in many instances secure a type of control that is adequate to meet his needs.

The wild and weird ceremonies of earlier man are not wild and weird from his viewpoint. The difference is one of culture. What to us seems confusion and disorder, to him appears normal and rational. Given the type of social consciousness of the native Australian, the North American Indian, the Bushman, or the Hottentot, the reaction could not be otherwise. To show this shall be part of my task in Part II.

²² William Wells Newell, "Ritual Regarded as the Dramatization of Myth," *The International Congress of Anthropology* (Chicago, 1894), p. 240.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 239.

PART II

DEVELOPMENT OF RITUALISM

"Der Mensch erkennt sich nur im Menschen, nur
Das Leben lehret jedem was er sei."

—GOETHE, *Tasso*, Act II, scene 3.

"Though existing religious ideas and institutions have an average adaptation to the characters of the people who live under them ; yet, as these characters are ever changing, the adaptation is ever becoming imperfect ; and the ideas and institutions need remodeling with a frequency proportional to the rapidity of the change."—HERBERT SPENCER, *First Principles*, sec. 34.

CHAPTER III

DETERMINING INSTINCTS AND IMPULSES OF THE PRIMITIVE CEREMONY

In the preceding chapters two points have been especially emphasized. The first is that the ceremony is intimately related to primitive man's practical life—that it is his method of practical control. The movement and decorations are not a sheer product of the imagination: they are the reproductions of situations with which the savage is familiar. The second point is that the ceremony is always a social reaction. Without the constant reference to other selves, real or imaginary, it has neither meaning nor purpose. The ceremony is a type of reaction emerging out of attitudes that are definitely social and that have been built up gradually in the struggle for life. It now becomes our task to justify this position more explicitly with reference to the origin and development of ritualism.

Here two difficulties at once loom up. The first is, that, when inquiry is made of primitive peoples who are in the habit of performing certain ceremonies—such as the Intichiuma of the native Australians or the Snake ceremonies of the Amerinds of New Mexico—they are unable to give an intelligent account of the origin of the rites. When W. H. R. Rivers tried to obtain an explanation from the Todas of any one of their ceremonies, he met with the same difficulty. He almost invariably received the reply, "that it had been so ordained by Teikirza,"¹ a goddess, and this was regarded as final. The Central Australians have no tradition which deals with the origin of the Intichiuma ceremonies,² a very important series. With reference to the initiation ceremonies among them, there are often the most naïve myths, which reveal a strong imagination and leave the impression that an explanation of some sort is very acceptable,³ but which could scarcely be construed into real history. Sometimes the myth accompanying the ceremony does offer an explanation of certain aspects of the ceremony. That the rite-myth, however, ever explains all the symbolism of the rite

¹ W. H. R. Rivers, *The Todas*, p. 186.

² Spencer and Gillen, *The Native Tribes of Central Australia*, p. 167.

³ Spencer and Gillen, *The Northern Tribes of Central Australia*, pp. 344-46.

is improbable.⁴ Then, again, there is the peculiar dilemma of two myths purporting to explain one ceremony, as in the case of the most ancient Navajo ceremony now in existence, the *kledji qacal*, or night chant.⁵ Altogether, the situation appears almost hopeless when viewed from the standpoint of what the primitive man himself consciously contributes toward an explanation of origins. Contemporary savages know little or nothing about the real origin of their many rituals, and hence we ought not to look to them for the solution of this perplexing problem of social psychology.

Here the second difficulty appears. While, in a sense, it is easier to look down from a higher than to look up from a lower stage of culture, there is always the danger of the "psychologist's fallacy" in estimating conditions among contemporaneous savages, and more so with reference to aboriginal humans. It is certainly a postulate which can be accepted without hesitation, that primitive man does not reason as the trained scientist. If his reactions are symptomatic in any sense whatever, so much would surely pass muster. For a modern scholar, then, to sit in his office and reason how a person must have felt under the conditions in which aboriginal peoples found themselves, and assert that the origin of religion is to be sought in primitive man's exercise of his faculty of "the perception of the Infinite" or in his "sense of the Infinite," certainly seems to be misconstruing the situation.⁶ It is not likely, if we are to judge from the experience that most individuals in a higher stage of culture have, that the "perception of the Infinite" enters largely into the warp and woof of the material of which life is made. A careful investigation through a widely circulated questionnaire might throw further light on this subject.

As it is, we must adopt a different method. Three guiding principles will put us on a modern scientific basis. (1) We may begin with the principle of the comparative psychologists that, from the phylogenetic standpoint, there is no real gap between animal and human experience. Man has started out with instincts and

⁴ Washington Matthews, "Some Illustrations of the Connection between Myths and Ceremony," *The International Congress of Anthropology* (Chicago, 1894), p. 246.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 247.

⁶ At least three modern scholars, Max Müller, C. P. Tiele, and Morris Jastrow, Jr., fall back on such a faculty in their explanation of the origin of religion.

impulses common to animals. What progress he has made has been from that point on. (2) We need to bear in mind that, though the stage of culture may vary, there is essential similarity in the mental organization of different races of men.⁷ (3) Our third principle is taken from functional psychology: Mind, wherever found, is "an organ of service for the control of environment in relation to the ends of the life process."⁸ With these three principles in view we may venture to interpret the concrete material gathered by ethnologists from actual observation among contemporary savages, or from reliable data secured through archaeological research.

A double task awaits us before we can hope to give a rational answer to the question of the origin and development of ritualism. We must, in the first place, attempt to describe the place of some of the more important determining instincts and impulses in the primitive ceremony—that is to say, such as would lead to overt reactions which would tend to crystallize into group habits, and thus become ritualized. Then there is the matter of the organization of human consciousness, which, too, is a consideration of first importance, for we must try to determine whether the ritual is symptomatic merely of blind impulse and chance variation, or of thought also. In the present chapter we turn to a consideration of the former.

The term primitive, as applied to man, has come to have a double connotation with us. Sometimes we use it with reference to contemporary savages. At other times its usage applies to aboriginal humans. While it may be true in a general sense that aboriginal human traits were similar to those of existing savages, yet it would be rather bold to assume that a study of contemporary savage life leads to accurate inferences regarding the aboriginal institutions. Existing savages have passed through a long period of mental development. This may have been retarded, and hence be more closely affiliated with aboriginal reactions than that of higher stages of culture; yet it marks an actual advance.

The evolutionary point of view suggests comparative psychology as the proper field in which to look for impulses and instincts that were fundamental and determining in ancient society. Primitive man was first animal and then man. As an animal he was a bundle

⁷ Franz Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man*. Vide also William I. Thomas, *Source Book for Social Origins* (Chicago, 1909), pp. 143-55.

⁸ John Dewey, *Interpretation of Savage Mind*; and see *Source Book for Social Origins*, p. 175.

of wants, impulses, and instincts, and made his way by the spontaneous expression of characteristics common to the species. That he had as many instincts as the higher animals and perhaps even more, would seem indisputable.⁹ As a man he supplemented his instinctive reactions by activity under the control of thought. Comparative psychology gives a long list of instincts and impulses which are common to animals and man. The more important ones for our study of the origin of ritualism are food, sex, fear, and anger. Food and sex are primary.¹⁰

It is probable that in his first condition man's mode of life was not far different from that of the anthropoid ape. We have even at this late date an example in the Pygmy of a human type "almost as fully arboreal as was his tree-dwelling ancestor."¹¹ **Food** He dwells in the moist and sultry depth of the forest, and pines when removed from his native realm in the heart of the tropic woods. Primeval man probably lived upon fruits and roots. This kind of subsistence restricted him to a tropical or subtropical climate. "In fruit and nut-bearing forest under a tropical sun," our progenitors commenced their existence.¹² We may assume that thus early man had the power of abstraction, for it is likely that language was his earliest invention, and that he made use of it while he was yet a tree-liver. But in this stage he was largely a creature of instinct and impulse. As we ascend in the scale of structural organization, subsistence becomes increasingly difficult and the food impulse relatively stronger. It is not improbable that intelligence early came to the surface in some food crisis. We may, at any rate, assert that the food impulse was a controlling factor in aboriginal man's life. He may have been frugivorous in practice for some time, but animal food became a part of his fare at any early period. He became a hunter, and from that time on, the food impulse became even more determining. Sex began to enter in as an essential factor. As long as fruits, nuts, and roots were the regular fare, man and woman were at about the same advantage. Both could gather as they pleased. When, how-

⁹ Th. Ribot, *The Psychology of the Emotions* (London, 1900), p. 194.

¹⁰ *I*vide W. I. Thomas, *Sex and Society*; and Edward Scribner Ames, *Psychology of Religious Experience*, chap. iii, "Determining Impulses in Primitive Religion."

¹¹ Charles Morris, *Man and His Ancestors* (New York, 1902), p. 134.

¹² Lewis H. Morgan, *Ancient Society* (New York, 1878), p. 20.

ever, animal food became a necessity, a marked division of labor resulted. Men were engaged in the hunt, while the attention of women was directed chiefly to the vegetable environment. Man's activities required strength, violence, speed, craft, and foresight. Woman's work was slow, unspasmodic, routine, and stationary.¹³ Man was the hunter; woman was the child-bearer and home-maker.

The thing of significance is that the food impulse manifested itself in totally different activities in men and women. As a simple impulse back of the hunt, the gathering of fruits, the sowing, the reaping, it was partly responsible for specific ceremonies for those occasions. The activities of both men and women were represented; but man, being stronger and more aggressive, was almost invariably the leader in the ceremony. This we call a direct influence upon the ceremony. To this we may add an indirect influence. The differentiation in the activities between men and women in getting the necessary food had a marked effect on primitive social organization. It was one of the controlling factors in naming the totems, and in this way definitely determined a large number of the totemic ceremonies of the Blacks of Australia, the Amerinds, and doubtless of other primitive peoples.

Next to the food impulse is the influence of the instinct of reproduction, or the sex impulse, upon primitive man's life. It is now quite generally conceded that the earliest group-
Sex ings of population were about the females. When primitive man desired a mate, he sought her. Woman became the social nucleus. To her, man returned from his wanderings. The relation between mother and child became peculiarly intimate. "The mother and her children, and her children's children, and so on indefinitely in the female line, form a group."¹⁴ Descent was through mother-right. Exogamy, so characteristic of tribal life, thus was a natural consequence of man's "emotional interest in making unfamiliar sexual alliances."¹⁵

Marriage by capture was probably an early form. It is not likely, however, that it ever was universal, as it would tend to give rise to the blood feud, and is contrary to the now generally recognized primitive mother-right. In the case of actual hostility

¹³ William I. Thomas, *Sex and Society* (Chicago, 1907), p. 123.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

between the groups, it was probably the normal form;¹⁶ but for the rest, marriage through barter, service, or purchase was in vogue.¹⁷ The significant fact for our study is that marriage ceremonies are a direct outgrowth of the sex impulse, and this not only in a general way. The specific content of the primitive ceremony is symptomatic of the sex impulse. Thus capture, which in addition to being a method of securing wives between hostile groups also is an expression of female coyness¹⁸ and of the rapacious nature of the male, became a part of the marriage ceremony. Among the Bedouins of Sinai, for instance, "the bridegroom seizes the woman whom he has legally purchased, drags her into her father's tent, lifts her violently struggling upon her camel, holds her fast while he bears her away, and finally pulls her forcibly into his house, though her powerful resistance may be the occasion of serious wounds."¹⁹ Wife purchase, an almost universal practice among primitive peoples, remained a part of the ceremony after it had ceased to be a reality.²⁰

¹⁶ Spencer and Gillen, *The Native Tribes of Central Australia*, p. 555.

¹⁷ Edward Westermarck, *The History of Human Marriage* (London, 1901), chap. xvii; George Elliot Howard, *A History of Matrimonial Institutions* (Chicago, 1904), I, chap. iv; William I. Thomas, *Sex and Society*, p. 78.

¹⁸ William I. Thomas, *Source Book for Social Origins*, p. 533.

¹⁹ George Elliot Howard, *A History of Matrimonial Institutions*, I, 165 f.

²⁰ Westermarck, *op. cit.*, p. 418. Arnold van Gennep gives the following account of betrothal and wedding ceremonies in which capture and marriage by purchase both survive in the marriage ceremony:

"Je citerai la séquence de ces cérémonies chez les Bhotia du Tibet méridional et du Sikkim: 1° des magiciens déterminent si le mariage projeté sera favorable; 2° les oncles de la fille et ceux du garçon se réunissent dans la maison du garçon puis se rendent dans celle de la fille et la demandent en mariage; 3° si les présents qu'ils ont apportés sont acceptés (cérémonie de *nangchang*), l'affaire est conclue; on détermine le montant de la dot et 4° on offre aux intermédiaires un repas rituel accompagné de prières (cérémonie dite *khelen*). . . . 5° Un an après vient la cérémonie *nyen*; c'est un repas (aux frais des parents du fiancé) auquel assistent tous les apparentés des deux côtés; on paie le prix de la fille; 6° un an après le *nyen*, il y a la cérémonie *changthoong*; a) un magicien détermine le jour favorable pour le départ de la fiancée de chez ses parents; b) on organise une grande fête où sont invités des lamas; c) deux hommes, surnommés à ce moment "voleurs," pénètrent de force dans la maison, soi-disant pour voler la fiancée; on se livre à un combat simulé; les "voleurs" sont rossés et on leur jette de la viande à moitié cuite dans la bouche; ils échappent à ce traitement en donnant de l'argent aux gardiens de la fiancée. Deux jours après les "voleurs" sont honorés et surnommés "Les-

The marriage ceremony may also indicate the new relation between the man and the woman. "Sometimes it symbolizes sexual intercourse, but more frequently the living together."²¹ The former is, of course, an extreme case. Marriage ceremonies of this type occur in Central Australia with essential uniformity. Spencer and Gillen give the following account of the ceremony in the Warra-munga tribe:

The girl is taken to the selected spot near to the camp by an elder sister who says to her, "Come with me, you and I walk along corroboree." Three tribal brothers who are *kulla-kulla* (lawful husbands) to her, the actual husband being in the middle, lie down full length, side by side on the ground. The elder sister places the girl across them and the operation (the rite of cutting open the vagina) is performed by an old man who is *wankilli* (father's sister's son) to the girl. . . . After the operation she is decorated with string, head-bands, armlets, and necklets, which, later on, she gives to her father and mother. The man to whom she has been allotted at once takes her to his camp, where she remains quietly until the next morning, the two sleeping on opposite sides of the fire. For two or three mornings after this the man takes her out with him when he goes into the bush—still having no intercourse with her—and on each occasion he rubs her body with grease and red ochre. During this time, she is busy collecting vegetable food—grass seed and yams—and takes these to her mother and elder sister, who then tie round her waist the small string apron called *matjulari*, the emblem of a married woman in this tribe. For two nights she is then lent to *turtundi* (mother's mother's brother), *wankilli* (father's sister's son), *kankwia* (paternal grandfather), *paperti* and *kukaitja* (elder and younger brothers, but not in blood), and *kulla-kulla* (lawful husbands). After this she becomes the property of the man to whom she was assigned.²²

In addition to its influence upon the content of the marriage ceremony, the sex impulse is doubtless the determining factor in circumcision, subincision, ceremonies to promote the growth of the breasts, love philters, various types of corroborees, and initiation

stratégistes-heureux"; d) les invités font des présents à la fiancée et à ses parents; e) cortège de départ avec réjouissances; f) le père et la mère du garçon viennent à la rencontre du cortège, les conduisent chez eux; fêtes pendant deux ou trois jours; g) la fille et ses apparentés retournent chez eux; 7° de nouveau un an après, cérémonie dite *palokh*; les parents de la fille lui remettant sa dot (le double de ce qu'on a payé pour elle ou d'avantage) et on la conduit en groupe chez le fiancé, où cette fois elle reste définitivement.—*Les Rites de Passage* (Paris, 1909), pp. 173 f.

²¹ Westermarck, *op. cit.*, p. 419.

²² Spencer and Gillen, *The Northern Tribes of Central Australia*, pp. 134 f.

rites in general. Passarge gives the description of a corroboree among the Bushmen—an initiation ceremony of a girl—which may serve as a case in point:

Die Mädchen sollen keine "Schule" durchmachen, aber der Eintritt der Reife wird auch gefeiert, und zwar bei den Aikwe durch den Elandbultanz—*duké*. Im Chanse hatte ich Gelegenheit, einen solchen Tanz zu beobachten und zu photographieren. Ein Mädchen hatte die erste Menstruation gehabt, infolgedessen versammelten sich Männer und Frauen zur Aufführung des durch Sitte und Brauch vorgeschriebenen Tanzes. Die alten Weiber stehen an einer Stelle und bilden die Musikkapelle, indem sie singen, in die Hände klatschen und mit Eisenstücken klappern. Zu ihren Füßen liegt das junge Mädchen auf der Erde. Die verheirateten jüngeren Frauen gehen nun im Gänsemarsch, zu dem Takt der Musik mit den Füßen aufstampfend und die nach abwärts ausgestreckten Arme gleichfalls rhythmisch nach unten stossend, um das Mädchen herum. . . . Dabei haben sie das hintere Schurtzfell hochgehoben. Mit dem entblößten Gesäss . . . wackeln und kokettieren sie umher. Das geht so eine Weile, plötzlich naht sich ein Buschmann langsamen Schrittes, gleichfalls im Takt mit den Füßen stampfend und mit den angezogenen Unterarmen und geballten Fäusten ebenfalls den Takt schlagend. Auf dem Kopf hat er ein paar Hörner nebst einem Stück Fell befestigt. . . .

Der gehörnte Buschmann ist der Bulle, die Weiber sind die Kühe, diese Beziehung ist unverkennbar. . . . Die Bewegungen der Bullen und der Kühe sind dabei so drastisch, dass man ohne weiteres erkennt, es handelt sich um eine Szene aus der Brunstzeit der imitierten Tiere.²³

Enough has been said to show that the lower races are intensely interested in sexual life. There is every reason to believe that this is one of the great interests of aboriginal man. In fact, we may assert without hesitation that a large number of ceremonies are due directly to the sex impulse, and that its indirect influence pervades a great many more.

From the phylogenetic point of view, fear should be considered a derivative rather than a primary instinct. It probably first came to the surface as a distinct emotional reaction when the animal had experienced actual danger and pain in quest of food. When, however, we come to higher forms of animal life, it has become a definite tendency. It no longer depends exclusively upon preceding experience, but takes the form of a conservative instinct in the defensive form.²⁴ Usually, though not

Fear

²³ S. Passarge, *Die Buschmänner der Kalahari* (Berlin, 1907), pp. 101 f.

²⁴ Th. Ribot, *The Psychology of the Emotions*, p. 207.

invariably, flight is the form in which it is manifested. The unexpected, the strange, be it sound or sight, causes the animal to run or fly away, if possible; and when flight is impossible, cringing or trembling or some corresponding reactions are common. I remember two little pups belonging to a friend of mine. I was a stranger to them. Though they played about the yard in the presence of others before I came, the moment I appeared they ran under a shed, and nothing I did could entice them out. Birds are afraid of a scarecrow, but not because they have had previous experience with it. It is owing to their instinctive tendency to be afraid of a strange moving object. "My friend Professor W. K. Brooks," writes James, "told me of his large and noble dog being frightened into a sort of epileptic fit by a bone being drawn across the floor by a thread which the dog did not see."²⁵

In children, fear manifests itself in not dissimilar ways. Everyone knows of the instinctive tendency of the small child to run away from the strange and unexpected, and seek the protective care of its mother. Strange men and strange animals very frequently excite fear. Some children cry with terror at the first sight of a cat or a dog. One of my little friends had often said that she would like to see Santa Claus. As Christmas approached, I reminded her that she would have an opportunity at the festival in the church. She was very eager to see him until he came. But when she heard him in the vestibule stamping his feet and speaking in a loud voice, and then saw his long white beard and fur coat and bold mien, she cried, saying to her mother to whom she clung, "I want to go home!"

This primitive type of fear is relatively undifferentiated, and is, of course, part of primitive man's original endowment. The fear-inspiring object "sets the whole motor apparatus going at the highest rate."²⁶ But experience soon comes in to modify the reaction. "The fear force is gradually rationalized and made less spasmodic and so more adaptive." Increasing discrimination as to the amount of pain likely to be inflicted affects the intensity of the reaction. To this we may add a vivid representation on the part of primitive man of potential pain, i.e., of the liability of its occurrence and the degree when it occurs. This vivid representa-

²⁵ William James, *Psychology, Briefer Course* (New York, 1907), p. 412.

²⁶ Hiram M. Stanley, *Studies in the Evolutionary Psychology of Feeling* (London, 1895), p. 109.

tion becomes a powerful stimulation for adaptive conduct. "Fear," writes Stanley, "is a primary and most important motive to action in a very wide range of the lower mental life. Those who have observed animals and man in a state of nature are always greatly impressed with the constant and large part which the emotion plays in their consciousness."²⁷

We are now ready to understand how important a place fear has in the primitive ceremony. In the Intichiuma ceremonies cited above, as well as in the rain ceremony, the "great fear," starvation, may easily become the leading motive. In fact, it is not at all unlikely that it took a very important part in their origin. A significant fact in confirmation of this is that in the case of the Australians the Intichiuma are not universally observed. Passing from the center of the continent north toward the Gulf of Carpentaria, we find that among the coastal tribes, Binbinga, Mara, and Anula, there are only traces of these ceremonies. This is doubtless due to the more abundant rainfall which insures a more certain food supply.²⁸ In the southeast, Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria, and South Australia, they are entirely absent. The reason for this, according to Dr. Howitt, is "the far more favorable conditions under which they live."²⁹ I cannot help feeling that the "great fear" has had the first place in the specific application of ceremonies to the food and rain situation in the regions under consideration. That the same tendency is at work among the Amerinds is shown by the observation made by Fewkes regarding the elaborate Snake dance of the Hopi Indians of Arizona. "The present purpose of the Snake ceremony, which in many publications has been confounded with the original aim, is primarily . . . to bring rain and thus promote the growth of corn; in fact this desire, due to present environment, dominates all the rites of the Hopi ritual."³⁰ In Arizona the climatic conditions are essentially the same as in Central Australia.

The illustrations cited above are in harmony with the position taken that fear becomes a powerful motive in preventing a repetition of painful or calamitous experiences. In this instance, it is

²⁷ Hiram M. Stanley, *Studies in the Evolutionary Psychology of Feeling* (London, 1895), p. 94.

²⁸ *The Northern Tribes of Central Australia*, p. 318.

²⁹ *The Native Tribes of South-east Australia*, p. 152.

³⁰ Jesse Walter Fewkes, "Tusayan Flute and Snake Ceremonies," *Nineteenth Annual Report of Bureau of American Ethnology*, p. 1009.

a food crisis. There are, however, many cases on record where the food impulse is lacking. The ceremonies concerned with the Wollunqua Totem of the Warramunga tribe of Australia are an excellent example.³¹ The Wollunqua, a mythic monster—"though it must be remembered that it is anything but mythic in the eyes of the native"—is supposed to be so large that "if it were to stand on its tail, its head would reach far away into the heavens." Its present home is a large water hole in a lonely valley in the Murchison Range, whence the natives fear it may venture forth and do damage. So afraid are they of this monster that they do not use its real name among themselves, but call it *urkulu nappaurinnia*, or "snake living in water." One feature of striking interest in the ceremonies of this totem is that in scope and nature they are very similar to those of the Black Snake Totem. The motive back of them, however, is the control of the dreadful monster, rather than the increase of the totem. One of the Wollunqua ceremonies, according to Spencer and Gillen, was begun by digging a trench north and south, fifteen feet long and two feet wide. This was then filled with sand mixed with water,

every handful being carefully patted down until finally a keel-shaped mound was made about two feet high and tapering off towards either end, its length corresponding to that of the original trench. On the smooth surface a long wavy band, about four inches in width, was outlined on each side, the two bands meeting at both ends. At the northern end a small round swelling indicated the head. . . . The whole double band indicated the body of the Wollunqua.³²

The mound was finished late in the afternoon. The Uluuru men to whom it really belonged then came to the sacred ground, approaching the mound in single file. The Wollunqua is believed to have seen his representation and to be wriggling about underneath. One of the Uluuru men took a gum bough in his hand and stroked the base of the mound to appease the snake. The ceremony continued all night. At times they sang for long stretches at a time without pausing. When three o'clock came,

amidst a scene of wildest excitement, fires were lighted all around the ceremonial ground. . . . The Uluuru men ranged themselves in single file kneeling beside the mound, and with their hands upon their thighs surged round and round it, every man in unison bending over first to one side and

³¹ *The Northern Tribes of Central Australia*, chap. vii, pp. 226-56.

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 233 f.

then to the other, each successive movement being accompanied by a loud and simultaneous shout. The Kingilli men were standing all around in a state of greatest excitement, the oldest man amongst them swaying his body about as, with exaggerated high-knee action, he walked backwards at the head of the kneeling procession of the Uluuru men. As the Kingilli clanged their boomerangs together, the Uluura swayed about wildly from side to side shouting, or rather yelling at each movement, "Yrrsh! yrrsh! yrrsh!"

When the earliest streak of dawn appeared, the Uluuru men, urged to their task by the Kingilli, "fiercely attacked the mound with spears, boomerangs, clubs and spear-throwers, until, in a few minutes, it was hacked to pieces and all that remained was a rough heap of sandy earth."³³ The object of this ceremony is obviously to persuade, almost to force, the Wollunqua to remain in his water hole, and "to do no harm to any of the natives." It is probable that this ceremony had its origin in some particular incident in which fear was very prominent. At any rate, fear is the impulse back of it now.

Fear is directly related to self-preservation. It is a conservative instinct in the defensive form. Things that inhibit, thwart, destroy are fearful. They cause pain and may eventuate in death. Strange things frequently are fearful. They may be a menace to life. The organism is so constituted that it is always on the look-out for the thing that may cause harm. Fear is the instinct that sets it in an attitude of defense or self-protection.

It thus makes possible the almost universal prevalence of taboos among primitive peoples. Fear of the future eventuates in various types of divination—such, for instance, as when the Babylonian priests read the liver of the acceptable animal in order to ascertain whether the war contemplated by the king would end favorably or unfavorably. And finally, fear is the determining factor in a considerable number of funeral ceremonies and propitiatory rites. It should be borne in mind, in this connection, that the thesis which we have tried to establish in regard to fear is not that fear determines the entire content of the ceremony, but only that it enters in as an important impulse in a large number of cases. We are not persuaded that Lucretius was correct when he said: "Primus in orbe timor fecit deos."

³³ *The Northern Tribes of Central Australia*, pp. 237 f.

Anger, like fear, is a derivative rather than a primary instinct. It is found low in the animal scale, and probably first appeared as a distinct emotional reaction when the animal was frustrated in its quest for food. In its effort to defend itself against the opposing animal, it became angered and was successful. Anger became the instinct of conservation under the offensive form. Fear had enabled the animal to avoid loss, but this new instinct was aggressive in overcoming hindrance. "Fear is regressive, anger is aggressive. Fear is contractile, anger is expansive. Fear is the emotion of the pursued, the prey; anger is the emotion of the pursuer, of the predaceous."³⁴ It was a momentous day in the evolution of mind when some individual actually became angry.

The characteristic thing about anger is self-assertion. When it becomes an overt reaction, it takes the form of open hostility. It is the direct opposite of fear. When the animal is afraid it tries to extricate itself from the painful situation, and having accomplished this, it is satisfied. When the animal is angry it is under the impulse of inflicting positive injury. Stanley holds that "with early psychisms, all perceptions of objects end in either anger or fear. . . . The organism perceives the object . . . feels fear and dashes away from it, or feels anger and dashes against it. In higher forms experience has entered in and controls the degree of hostility."³⁵ But even in man it is present in some measure in its first form. Children of two months push away objects they do not like, with real fits of passion, growing red in the face, trembling all over, and sometimes shedding tears. "At about one year old they will beat people, animals, and inanimate objects if they are angry with them, throw things at offending persons, and the like."³⁶ Nor does this simple, immediate sort of anger disappear entirely in adult life. Who has not felt an instinctive wave of anger when he has knocked his shin against a rocking-chair in the dark, or struck his head against a low door? The reason for this is that anger is, first and always, a social instinct. The feeling of resentment which appears is but a vestige of the way in which lower forms react against every

³⁴ Stanley, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 137.

³⁶ Charles Horton Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order* (New York, 1902), p. 232.

frustrating object. It is only very gradually that man has attained the ability to distinguish between the physical and the social, and has come to feel that it is after all absurd to be angry at a chair or a door.

On one of my travels in the interior of China, I was one morning the witness of a most interesting ceremony in which anger was the impelling motive. A Chinese woman, according to the regular custom, had hung out some clothes on a bamboo pole to dry, and a thief had come along and stolen them while she was inside looking after the house. When she came out in front of the house and discovered that her clothes had disappeared, she flew into a rage. Forthwith she anathematized the thief by all the gods of the pantheon, and perceiving that it was of no avail she turned her attention to magic. Seizing a bundle of straw from the roof of the house, she twisted it into a shape vaguely resembling a man. This effigy of the thief she held on a block of wood and then proceeded to chop it in a thousand pieces, while she wished the perpetrator of the crime every curse that earth and the infernal regions might have in store.

Far from being an exceptional method among primitive peoples, this magical ceremony is but one out of many. A very common method of venting one's anger is to make the effigy of wax, clay, or other material, and then stick pins or needles through it, or otherwise maltreat it, with the definite purpose of thereby causing the death of the enemy.³⁷ In Australia pointing-sticks are commonly used in evil magic. These are "short sticks or bones with one end sharpened and the other usually, but not always, tipped with porcupine-grass resin."³⁸ Spencer and Gillen give the following description of the use of these sticks:

In the Arunta tribe a man desirous of using any of these goes away by himself to some lonely spot in the bush, and, placing the stick or bone in the ground, crouches down over it, muttering the following or some similar curse as he does so:

"May your heart be rent asunder."

³⁷ *Vide Malay Magic*, pp. 570-74. In West Africa, "if you want to cause an enemy to die, you make a clay figure that is supposed to represent him, with a needle you pierce the figure, and your enemy, the first time he comes in contact with a foe, will be speared."—Robert Hamill Nassau, *Fetichism in West Africa* (New York, 1904), p. 117.

³⁸ *The Northern Tribes of Central Australia*, p. 455.

"May your backbone be split open and your ribs torn asunder."

"May your head and throat be split open."

Having done this he returns to his camp leaving the *irna* (stick) in the ground, but after some time he brings it back again and secretes it somewhere close to his camp. Then one evening, after it has grown dark . . . he removes the stick from its hiding-place, and, taking care that no one sees him, quietly creeps up until he is close enough to distinguish the features of his victim. He then stoops down, and turning his back to the camp, takes the *irna* in both hands and jerks it repeatedly over his shoulders, muttering the same curses again. The evil magic . . . goes from the point of the *irna* straight to the man, who afterwards, without apparent cause, sickens and dies, unless his life is saved by some medicine man who can discover and remove evil magic.³⁹

Besides the methods described, there are numerous other ways of inflicting permanent injury and death by means of the magical ceremony. It is obvious that anger and its derivative, jealousy, are important factors, both in the origin and in the survival of such ceremonies. The influence here is direct. The war dance is a ceremony in which anger may have both a primary and a secondary influence. Sometimes the Amerinds had the war dance just before they started on an expedition. At other times, it took place after. In some instances, perhaps, both before and after. But in any case, the object was to stir up and give vent to violent passion. Peter Jones, missionary to the Indians, thus describes the dance:

The war dance is designed to kindle the passion for war in every breast; and certainly, when we consider their war song, painted bodies, war implements, and the warriors' antics performed on such occasions, nothing could be better calculated to rouse the feeling to the highest state of excitement. A smooth piece of ground is chosen for the exhibition, in the center of which a pole is placed. The singers take their seats and begin to beat on their drums, to which they keep time by singing in a most monotonous tone. The warriors, fully equipped, dance round and round the pole, brandishing their tomahawks, throwing their bodies into all sorts of postures, and raising at intervals the hideous war whoop. A warrior will occasionally strike the pole, which is a signal that he is about to make a speech. On a sudden the dancing and singing cease, and all attention is given to the speaker while he relates his war exploits, and receives the hearty response of the assembly. At these dances they also have a sham fight in which they

³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 457 f.

exhibit the manner of surprising the enemy—tomahawking, scalping, and drinking the blood of the foe.⁴⁰

Manifestly various impulses are operating in the war dance as described by Jones, but that pugnacity takes the first place is shown by the very nature of the ceremony. The thought of impending war and the reinstating of movements in the dance which have actually taken place in combat tend to arouse the passion for war. If to this we add the fact that speeches are made by the warriors in which they relate the successes of previous wars, and call special attention to the wrongs perpetrated against the tribe by the enemy, it is easy to understand that the natives are brought thoroughly under the influence of the instinct of pugnacity.

Herewith we close the discussion of determining instincts and impulses in ritualism. The situation is so complex that it is next to impossible to do it full justice. In many instances, there are a number of determining impulses—that is to say, there is overlapping. Which impulse will be of first importance will depend upon the situation which is to be controlled. No attempt has been made to give an exhaustive list. Others—such, for instance, as self-display, an instinct closely related to the sex instinct—might have been discussed, but only those have been selected that appear to be of first importance. In his *Development of Religion*⁴¹ Professor King has placed considerable emphasis upon play in the genesis of the religious attitude. To the present writer, the place of play appears of minimum importance in the origin of ritualism. Practical interests are by far the most important. Play itself, when viewed from the agent's standpoint, is largely a practical interest. Take the little girl playing with her dolls, for example. How does she regard them? Are they so much porcelain, hair, sawdust, and cloth, made into a doll cold and lifeless? No. The child enters into an actual living relation. She is the mother of the child. The baby must be sung to sleep, or wheeled about in the go-cart, or taught how to pray. For the time being, this activity, spontaneous though it may be, contains for the child a large practical element.

⁴⁰ Peter Jones, *History of the Ojebway Indians* (London, 1861), p. 133.

⁴¹ Irving King, *Development of Religion* (New York, 1910), chap. v.

In the development and survival of the ceremony, so-called play activities may emerge, but not without practical implications. Thus, in the course of the prolonged and serious initiation ceremonies of the Blacks of Southeast Australia, humorous situations are introduced to relieve the strain and monotony. Moreover, there is, to judge from personal observation, among various stages of culture a tendency (due to a complex of instincts and impulses, as well as to the law of habit) to subserve in the form of play activities interests which in time past were essential to the struggle for life. The popular theater in China, and many of our modern plays are cases in point. The various rituals of the Iroquois also contain such elements.⁴²

In this general class of instinctive and impulsive acts, though strictly speaking some are not instincts, we include all activities of the psychophysical organism due, not to thought, but to more or less automatic action. The probable origin of the lamentation rites in the spontaneous outburst of grief at the death of a particularly intimate member of the group is an example. The thing of importance for our study is that this substratum of instinct, impulse, and reflex action which functions in man's efforts to control his environment appears in the rites and ceremonies in various forms. Ritualism is built upon this native endowment, not however, let it be noted, consciously *qua* ritualism. What primitive man sought was not ritual but control.

⁴² Lewis H. Morgan, *League of the Iroquois* (New York, 1904).

CHAPTER IV

THE PLACE OF ATTENTION IN THE PRIMITIVE CEREMONY

Primitive man's ceremonies represent the functioning of inherited tendencies to action. The immediate and pressing needs in the conservation of life have given rise to them. Primitive man has the sex impulse, and consequently the marriage ceremony. He has the food impulse, but the climate is hot and dry and there is no food. Hence he has the rain ceremony. He has been injured by someone, or frustrated in his desires, and anger functions in offensive action. Hence primitive man has the "black art." In so far as the ceremony is an expression of innate hereditary acts and nothing more, there is no conscious control, and the question of origin is entirely submerged in the problem of the genesis of these attitudes and is purely a question of phylogenesis. But to the writer many of the ceremonies described by the anthropologist seem to give evidence of thought¹ as well as of instinct and impulse.

A careful study of the organization of human consciousness will throw further light upon the question of origins and development as far as there is indication of thought in ritualism. The view taken by Brinton and Pfeiderer regarding the origin of rites may serve as a point of departure. Both agree in placing it in mimicry or imitation of higher powers. "The oldest religious usages of all were not," writes Pfeiderer, "as is generally supposed, sacrifice and prayers in which men bring before the heavenly ones definite wishes which they entreat them to grant. . . . The oldest usages were much more naïve . . . acts, in fact, which imitate the doings of the higher powers, or are meant to accompany and assist these doings."² Brinton gives his view in the following words: "The mimicry or imitative origin of rites is well illustrated in that in use for 'rain-making,' one of the commonest of all. In periods of drought the Indian rain-maker mounts to the roof of his hut, and rattling vigorously a dry gourd

¹ Vide John Dewey, *How We Think* (Boston, 1910), chap. i.

² Otto Pfeiderer, *The Philosophy of Religion on the Basis of Its History* (London, 1888), III, 24.

containing pebbles to represent the thunder, scatters water through a reed on the ground beneath, as he imagines up above in the clouds do the spirits of the storm."³

The first objection to any such statement of the origin of ceremonies is that there is reason to believe, as we shall show later, that primitive man made use of ceremonies before he had framed the concept of gods. Anthropologists at this late day give descriptions of ceremonies in which no higher power has a place. Spencer and Gillen, for instance, make the statement regarding the Intichinma ceremonies, that "their performance is not associated in the native mind with the idea of appealing to the assistance of any supernatural being."⁴ But granted that the savage has a notion of a higher power, supernatural being, or god, it yet is true that the ceremony did not have its origin merely in the imitation of that power. Brinton's illustration will serve to bring out this point.

Wherever the rain ceremony is in vogue, there are periods when there is great need of rain. The rain ceremony is the type of overt reaction used by primitive man in attempting to produce rain. The savage is in a position of stress and strain. He is facing a crisis. Perhaps his corn is drying up in the field, or it is time that the dry season come to a close, and the warm rains descend and transform the desert into a paradise. Starvation threatens. What shall he do? There seems but one way of escape. He knows that he cannot make rain himself. If rain is to come, the power that makes rain must be influenced. But how can this be effected? The answer is not far off. He must influence the personified rain, or the higher power that causes rain. The Central Australians afford an example of the former, and the Indians of New Mexico and Arizona of the latter. Given a language, which presumably man had before he migrated to districts where drought occurred and rain became imperative, one natural resort would be to it as an influencing medium. Language is today actually used by the Kaffirs in trying to stop a storm. Or we may express it in another way by saying that there would be a tendency to resort to gesture. It is in the realm of gesture that all men live. Language itself is a type of gesture. Man is as much at home in gesture as the duck in water. The "We want you to rain" of primitive man's language when

³ Brinton, *op. cit.*, pp. 173 f.

⁴ *The Native Tribes of Central Australia*, p. 170.

carried over into pantomimicry is the rain ceremony of the Indian, or of the Central Australian, or of the rain-maker of Torres Straits.

It is doubtless due to hasty generalization that both Pfeiderer and Brinton see in this process nothing more than imitation of the higher power. They are correct in so far as the rain ceremony is an attempt at a reproduction of the rain situation, but miss the point when they judge that "definite wishes" are not thereby presented to the higher power. Suggestion is present, but there is more than that. The rain ceremony is an instance of the gesture process. Pantomimicry here involves putting oneself into the place of the higher power. Pfeiderer and Brinton recognize this. But pantomimicry also implies representation, for man is from the start social. When he engages in pantomimicry there is always some real or imaginary social being to be influenced. In this case the savage goes through the gesture that means rain, and this implies asking for rain.

Human consciousness, then, is not organized on the principles which seem to underlie the arguments of both writers. When our ancestors were gradually coming up from their very humble origin in the animal world, they brought with them a native endowment consisting of a group of instincts or tendencies to action accompanied by certain emotions. Race habits we may call them. We have no reason for assuming, however, that among these instincts there was one that made men *ab initio* religious, or that there was one which urged them blindly to imitate everything they saw, or even that which they very much desired. The instincts which they brought with them were all tendencies to action that had been of immeasurable value in the onward progress already made and constituted the foundation upon which man was to build his structure of culture. The process in the race has been, on the whole, upward from this foundation, and the theory of recapitulation as applied to the mental phase of life would at least contain this truth, that in ontogenesis, too, the progress is from the foundation of instincts upward.

What were the conditions under which primitive man first began to control his conduct by thought? As long as his habitual methods (the standpoint is that the instincts at first alone determined the habits) of meeting his needs were adequate, there was no occasion for thought. Habit would carry him on smoothly and safely. But

when the crisis came, when he had to meet a difficult situation, then the question of control became of first importance.

How or when we do not know, but out of some conflict between instinct on the one hand and crisis on the other, attention was born. It became the organ of accommodation which manipulates the outside world. The problem of mental development from the lowest to the present-day highest stage of culture thus has been that of getting adequate attention. "Language, reflection, discussion, logical analysis, abstraction, mechanical invention, magic, religion, and science" have all "developed in the effort of the attention to meet difficult situations through a readjustment of habit."⁵

The ritualistic attitude, to judge from its general prevalence at the dawn of historic time, as well as from its universal prevalence among contemporary savages, appeared very early. It was natural that it should. Ritualism represents crystallized group habits. Human nature has always been prone to fall back upon the habitual mode of reacting, and to think only when occasion calls for thought. No stage of culture affords a better example of this than the lowest known stage today. The Bushman is perfectly contented when he has enough to eat and a pipe to smoke. "*Besitz macht ihm Sorge, und er ist darin der wahre Philosoph, omnia sua secum portans.*"⁶ As long as there is something left to eat he feels no need of going out to hunt. In fact, he at times goes hungry, drawing a strap tighter and tighter about his stomach.⁷ But when he finally ventures forth, it is under the protection of magic. Right-angled stripes one centimeter broad and two centimeters long are tattooed on the arm above the elbow. They insure a good eye when shooting. These stripes are well rubbed with a special charm made by pulverizing a charred piece of the heart and of the left ear of the kind of animal he is going to hunt. The animal—giraffe, for instance—will then be unable to hear him as he steals up through the grass and brush.⁸

The point I wish to emphasize is that many of the specific types of reaction that later become crystallized into ceremonies or rites had their origin, logically and psychologically speaking, in a prob-

⁵ William I. Thomas, *Source Book for Social Origins* (Chicago, 1900), p. 17.

⁶ Gustav Fritsch, *Die Eingeborenen Süd-Afrikas* (Breslau, 1872), p. 419.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 427.

⁸ S. Passarge, *Die Buschmänner der Kalahari* (Berlin, 1907), pp. 108 f.

lematic situation. Now there are two ways of bringing this about. The first is through trial and error without even the crudest thought. The second is where voluntary attention becomes the organ for manipulating the outside world, or in other words, where thought enters in and helps in bringing about an adjustment. While it may be possible to find ceremonies which appear to bear no trace of the human mind, many of them are indicative of the power of abstraction, and that is a thought process. There is the great danger here of falling into the error of the particularistic method—of “overlooking the fact that the mind employs the principle of abstraction.”⁹

By thought in this connection we do not mean to imply a highly rationalized procedure. The savage has not acquired the elaborate technique of scientific method. We do not find that in the comparatively high civilizations of ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia. Scientific method is a gradual development out of an attempt at adequate theory. As long as immediate practical interests are at stake theory is neglected. This does not imply, however, that a real thought process is lacking. Thought, like many other aspects of human life, has passed through a process of development, the nature of which we can understand in part by observing its progress in ontogenesis. Abstraction in its simplest form is the isolating of a single content, element, or relation without getting its connections. This particular phase of experience is then frequently related to some practical interest and thus becomes a factor in the control of activity. A concrete example from the life of the Chinese taken from personal observation will serve as illustration. They select the terrifying aspect of an eclipse of the sun and relate it at once to great disaster to themselves. This view of the situation results in two further steps. First, the cause of the phenomenon is explained as an attempt of the dragon to swallow the sun. In the second place, an effort is made to control the situation. The method employed is the vigorous beating of gongs of all sizes to attract the attention of the dragon and influence it to spit out the sun. Processes such as these represent the beginning of reflection; the elaborate scientific method of the modern period, its goal.

In any organized system of habits *qua* organized there is no

⁹ William I. Thomas, *Source Book for Social Origins*, p. 24.

dualism of self and world.¹⁰ Many ceremonies imply the actual emergence of a duality. The reasoning back of the ceremony may be very naïve, but it is nevertheless thought. The piacular sacrifice is manifestly an example. This sacrifice by very definition implies a situation of stress, strain, and sometimes of interrupted relation between the worshiper and the higher power or ancestor. If the sacrifice should be referred back to the time when the offering was a common meal, the objection would be justified that this last-named sacrifice is really not the same as the piacular sacrifice; and on the ground that, though it is a development out of the primitive common meal, the underlying idea now is radically different. The piacular sacrifice is definitely a sin offering, while the other is a common meal. But the same point holds good equally in the instance of the common meal, for this was always an occasion on which the relation of the group, and hence also of the individuals of the group, to the totem was much in evidence.¹

By crises, in this connection, I mean any incident which comes sufficiently into conflict with the run of habit to call forth the attention. It need not always be something as terrifying as impending doom. The fear of starvation lies at the heart of certain ceremonies. Especially is this true in districts where food is periodically hard to procure. But there are vast areas in the tropics where people never experience this "great fear." Fruit is always plentiful, and game is at hand in great numbers and is easily procurable. Under such circumstances, the organized system of habit easily fills the food bill. No ritual will ordinarily arise here except when some mystery or difficulty interrupts. As soon as man begins definitely to cultivate grain himself, then sowing, planting, and reaping ceremonies may appear.¹¹ In connection with the hunt they may also be considered necessary. Birth, death, and adolescence are universal phenomena. Both in low and in high stages of culture they represent crises. In the former they almost invariably are the occasion of rites. Exhaustion of game, defeat in battle, floods, drought, pestilence, famine, birth, death, adolescence, marriage; sowing, planting, reaping, migration from one place to another, building of houses, are all examples of crises.

¹⁰ John Dewey, "The Control of Ideas by Facts" (II), *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Method*, IV, 254.

¹¹ Walter William Skeat, *Malay Magic*, pp. 217 f.

Anything that draws out the attention and thus demands adjustment and manipulation may, and usually does, stimulate thought. All of the above mentioned and many others are represented in primitive ritualism. In fact, we are told that among primitive peoples every act of life has become the object of ritualistic observances. If this is universally true, it would simply indicate that in the course of time any habit is likely to be interrupted.

Attention, in the sense in which it is here used, is primarily a matter of individual initiative. The group may create a positive environment and eliminate certain factors from the sphere of control. It thus is *par excellence* the realm of suggestion. Almost invariably, however, it is some individual or individuals of the group that pass beyond the mere instinctive or habitual, and bring about a satisfactory adjustment at the time of the crisis, or lead the group through the problematic situation. It takes thought to accomplish this. Considering the group as a whole, there is lack of prevision, for attention is primarily a manifestation of the individual. What prevision there is, is present in the consciousness of the individuals who originate and emphasize particular types of reaction that, because they are successful and appropriate, are taken up by the group. The recognition of this fact is of considerable importance. Is it not likely, for instance, that the *Quabara* (sacred ceremonies) owned by individuals among the Blacks of Central Australia have had their origin in just this way?

Then there is the question of magic. Does the magical ceremony give evidence of the power of abstraction, or not? Magic, writes Professor Thomas, is "primitive philosophy."¹² The reasoning is, of course, unscientific. Scientific reasoning and accurate logical technique are, as we have seen, a comparatively modern product and occur only in relatively high stages of culture. Even there, they are not always able to hold their own. Primitive man believes "that objects in juxtaposition, in an order of sequence, or having points of resemblance have also causal connection." This way of interpreting cause and effect gives rise to two more or less distinct and yet overlapping types of magic, viz., sympathetic and symbolic. My position on this point is that magic is a thought product—crude, it is true, but nevertheless thought.¹³

¹² *Source Book for Social Origins*, p. 733.

¹³ I do not mean to imply that there may not be, as Professor King asserts, the underlying content of more or less impulsive action of the psychophysical

One or the other of these types of magic is very frequently present in the primitive ceremony, and often both. In sympathetic magic the underlying principle is "that objects which were once related to one another retain their connection though they may be separated, and whatever may happen to one part or object the other part or object is similarly affected."¹⁴ Thus in the Malay peninsula a ceremonial way of killing an enemy is to take parings of nails, hair, eyebrows, saliva, or any other part of the intended victim, and to make them up into his likeness with wax from a deserted bees' comb. This figure is then slowly scorched by holding it over a lamp every night for seven nights and saying: "It is not wax that I am scorching; it is the liver, heart, and spleen of *So-and-so* that I scorch."¹⁵ After the seventh time, the figure is burnt and the victim will die.

In symbolic magic, the reasoning is that resembling things influence each other. A result can be attained by reproducing as nearly as possible the thing desired. How this becomes the occasion for thought is obvious from the rain ceremony in Murray Island, Torres Straits, of which Professor Haddon gives the following description:¹⁶

The rain-maker scooped a hole in the ground, and lined it with leaves and placed in it a rude stone image of a man which had previously been anointed with oil and rubbed with scented grass: then he poured the decoction of minced leaves of various plants mixed with water over the image—the image being so laid in the hole as to point to the quarter from which rain was expected. Earth was heaped over the image and leaves and shells placed on the mound, and all the while he muttered an incantation in a low sepulchral tone. Four large screens composed of plaited coco-nut leaves were placed at the head, foot, and sides of the grave to represent clouds: on the upper part of each was fastened a blackened oblong of vegetable

organism. But it is a far call from the automatic to magic. The act does not become magical until there is a consciousness of meaning present. And consciousness of meaning implies reflection. It is, of course, possible, and doubtless frequently happens, that magic is used without reflection, simply because that is the customary process. But that is entirely different from saying that magic *qua* magic arose apart from thought. Magic minus teleology may be instinct or automaton, but it does not deserve the name of magic. (*Vide* King, *The Development of Religion*, pp. 179 ff.)

¹⁴ Alfred C. Haddon, *Magic and Fetishism* (Chicago), pp. 2 f.

¹⁵ *Vide Malay Magic*, p. 570.

¹⁶ Haddon, *Magic and Fetishism*, pp. 16 f.

cloth to mimic a black thunder-cloud, and coco-nut leaves, with their leaflets pointing downward, were suspended close by to represent rain. A torch was ignited and waved lengthwise over the grave; the smoke represented clouds and the flame mimicked lightning, and a bamboo clapper was sounded to imitate thunder.

That such a ceremony represents thought appears indisputable. How such a complicated, rationally concatenated series of acts could originate by a mere trial and error method is inconceivable. For reasons which I shall give farther on, I venture to suggest that the view of symbolic magic represented by Frazer and Haddon fails to emphasize sufficiently one point. Primitive man has not reached the stage of mental development which distinguishes sharply between social objects and physical objects. For him, the thing that he is influencing is a social object which is influenced in much the same way as his fellow-men are.¹⁷ Primitive man knows no other way. If the power cannot be influenced by language or pantomimicry, primitive man has no means at hand. Thus, when a Kaffir village headed by its medicine-man rushes to the nearest hill and tries to divert a hurricane from its course by yelling at it to get out of the way, we have language as the influencing medium,¹⁸ and when the Indian rain-maker reproduces rain in a symbolic fashion we have pantomimicry as the medium. Both represent a thought situation, but not as closely akin to natural science as Frazer implies in the *Golden Bough*.¹⁹

At this juncture it is obvious that the situation of stress, strain, and conflict is the occasion for the reworking of instinct and impulses into a specific type of control. The incident or crisis, thus, is the matrix out of which the specific overt reaction is born, which later appears in the ceremony. This point should be borne in mind. The reaction is not a ceremony when it first appears. It is merely a method of meeting a particular situation. In the majority of instances the originator of the act has no

¹⁷ The clippings of hair, parings of nails, etc., mixed with wax in making an effigy are thought to convey the soul of the individual of whom they originally were a part. Wundt calls them "Seelenträger" (*Völkerpsychologie*, Zweiter Band, Zweiter Teil, S. 336). The effigy forthwith becomes a social object in most intimate relation with the party to be injured.

¹⁸ R. R. Marett, "Pre-animistic Religion," *Folk-Lore*, XI, 171.

¹⁹ J. G. Frazer, *The Golden Bough*, 2d ed. (London, 1900), I, 9-74.

intention of its ever becoming a ceremony, or part thereof.²⁰ If the particular reaction is not repeated until it becomes a group custom, it never eventuates in a ceremony. Nor does it become a ceremony as long as it is merely the act (though repeated) of one individual. It must become a group custom, that is to say, must be performed by the group, or with the approval of the group, or in the way in which the members of the group act. The way it becomes this is through suggestion and the law of habit. The act which is successful or accompanies a successful act is repeated by the members of the group. Each repetition, from a physiological point of view, deepens the new pathway of discharge formed in the brain of the individuals by the first performance of the act. When the pathway is once well opened, incoming currents from stimulation, similar to that preceding the first act, ever after tend to traverse the same pathway. When once the reaction has become a group habit among primitive peoples, it *ipso facto* is ritualized.

Since it is out of a crisis that this reaction is born, the situation is chiefly emotional. Thought enters in only in so far as habit fails to mediate control. It should not be considered remarkable that this is the only place reflection holds in the ceremony, for it takes no more important place anywhere else. The end sought in the ceremony is control. Attention is the organ of manipulation. The accompanying affective current appears as emotion when there is a checking, and an interest when it runs smoothly.

²⁰ The careful deliberation of the old men among the Australians as to each step of the initiation ceremonies is one of the exceptions. It shows that in some instances the development of the ceremony is due to deliberate planning for the introduction of more satisfactory control into the ceremonies.

CHAPTER V

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE SUPERNATURALISM IN THE RITUAL¹

Up to the present we have shown that the content of the ceremony consists of a combination of elements: (1) such as result from the normal functioning of primitive man's instinctive and impulsive activity in meeting his practical needs; (2) elements introduced through the trial and error method; (3) the product of thought when instinct or habit meets a crisis. One very important part of the ceremony, however, which, as we shall see, properly falls under (1), remains unexplained. Abundant reference has been made to it, but no explanation offered. I refer to the personified nature powers, the manes, the spirits good and evil, the preternatural and supernatural powers that take such a prominent part in the make-up of the social consciousness of the savage. Without these powers, most, if not all, of primitive man's ceremonies would drop away. Our problem in this chapter is to explain this phase of the social consciousness of primitive man, and its relation to the ceremony.

Many descriptions of the primitive social consciousness have been given, but most of them from the wrong point of view. As this is an attempt to give the psychology of ritualism, I shall first point out what I believe to be faulty psychology on this point. Both Jevons and Menzies agree that the savage regards all things "as animated with a life like his own."² It is to the "like his own" that critical attention should be directed. My thesis on this point is that, though aboriginal man regards nature as animated, it is not with a life "like his own." He has not reached the stage where he has made a reflective study of his own life, will, personality, or spirit; and until that study—naïve though it may be—has been

¹ The distinction between natural and supernatural is not made by primitive man. It is a comparatively late product.

² "The savage regards all things as animated—as animated with a life like his own."—Allan Menzies, *History of Religion* (New York, 1906), p. 21.

"The savage imagines that even lifeless things are animated by a will, a personality, a spirit like his own."—Frank Byron Jevons, *An Introduction to the History of Religion* (London, 1904), p. 11.

made, he is not in a position to attribute these to objects round about him.

The popular idea that man's consciousness of himself is immediate, primitive, and alone by itself, while his social consciousness is gradually acquired apart from the former through intercourse with other selves, and is thus secondary, is based on false psychology.³ Anyone who will take the time to make a table of instincts will easily see that a number of them are definitely social, McDougall in his *Introduction to Social Psychology* gives eleven, viz., flight, repulsion, curiosity, pugnacity, self-abasement, self-assertion, parental instinct, instinct of reproduction, gregarious instinct, instinct of acquisition, and instinct of construction.⁴ All these have social implications, while such as pugnacity reproduction, the gregarious instinct, are social only. This, if interpreted correctly, indicates "the implicit presence in undeveloped human consciousness of both the matter and the form of a social object."⁵

If we approach the study of primitive man's social consciousness from this direction, the conclusion is that the social consciousness is prior to the consciousness of self. That is to say, that primitive man does not first have a definite idea of his own life, will, or personality and then posit these in other objects. Primitive man's idea of himself grows out of his relation to his surroundings, and especially out of his relation to his fellows.

What is more, if it is once granted that among the instincts and impulses the social ones predominate, then it is also apparent that the normal functioning of his capacities is in the direction of progressively recognizing and creating social objects. Their number and character depend on the one hand on man's environment, and on the other on his ability to abstract certain objects as purely physical. At first, however, primitive man has not acquired the ability to concentrate his attention on a particular object in such a way as to consider it physical no matter what happens. The only distinction he soon seems able to draw in the vast number of

³ *Vide* Josiah Royce, *Studies of Good and Evil* (New York, 1898), chap. viii; James Mark Baldwin, *Mental Development in the Child and the Race* (New York, 1895); Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretation in Mental Development* (New York, 1902), pp. 13 f.

⁴ William McDougall, *Social Psychology* (Boston, 1909), pp. 45-80.

⁵ George H. Mead, "Social Psychology as Counterpart to Physiological Psychology," *Psychological Bulletin*, VI (No. 12), 404.

objects which are physical from the scientific standpoint is between the normal and the accidental or unusual. Thus the Pygmy considers his knife as commonplace so long as it serves him at his regular task, but when it slips and cuts his finger, there is *oudah* in the "cussed" thing.⁶ It forthwith becomes a social object to him. The Babylonians went even farther, for they thought they were surrounded by living powers, each of which was considered a *si* or spirit. A *si* was not a spirit in the sense in which that term is ordinarily used. "The *si* was simply that which manifested life, and the test of the manifestation of life was movement."⁷ In this instance everything that moved became a social object.

There is reason to believe that in the preanimistic stage (using animism in Tylor's sense of separable spiritual beings), not only the moving object that arrests the attention of the savage is personified, but anything unusual in shape, size, position, or color is regarded as living. Marett finds the following to be true:

A solitary pillar of rock, a crumpled volcanic boulder, a meteorite, a pebble resembling a pig, a yam, or an arrowhead, a piece of shining quartz, these and such as these are almost certain to be invested with the vague but dreadful attributes of Powers. Nor, although to us nothing appears so utterly inanimate as a stone, is savage animatism in the least afraid to regard it alive. Thus the Kanakas differentiate their sacred stones into males and females, and firmly believe that from time to time little stones appear at the side of the parent blocks.⁸

This is the period called by Marett Animatism, and by Clodd Naturalism.⁹

The distinction made between the usual and the unusual, and the personification of the striking phenomena are already found in the animal world. Clodd cites an instance from Romanes:

A skye-terrier . . . used to play with dry bones by tossing them in the air, throwing them to a distance, and generally giving them the appearance of animation, in order to give himself the ideal pleasure of worrying them. On one occasion I tied a long and fine thread to a dry bone and gave him

⁶ R. R. Marett, "Is Taboo a Negative Magic?" *Anthropological Essays* (presented to Edward Burnett Tylor) (Oxford, 1907), p. 230.

⁷ Archibald Henry Sayce, *Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion as Illustrated by the Religion of the Ancient Babylonians* (London, 1891) (Hibbert Lectures, 1887), p. 328.

⁸ R. R. Marett, "Preanimistic Religion," *Folk-Lore*, XI, 174.

⁹ Edward Clodd, *Animism* (Chicago), p. 22.

the latter to play with. After he had tossed it about for a short time, I took the opportunity, when it had fallen at a distance from him and while he was following it up, of gently drawing it away from him by means of the long, invisible thread. Instantly his whole demeanor changed. The bone, which he had previously pretended to be alive, began to look as if it were really alive, and his astonishment knew no bounds. He first approached it with nervous caution, but, as the slow receding movement continued and he became quite certain that the movement could not be accounted for by any residuum of force which he had himself communicated, his astonishment developed into dread and he ran to conceal himself under some articles of furniture.¹⁰

The naïve situation of regarding the inanimate objects as alive is also exemplified by the way little children regard their dolls. In the primitive ceremony this attitude comes to the surface wherever the object itself is viewed as though it were living and as though it could be influenced without any further mediation. The Intichiuma ceremony cited in the first chapter is obviously a case in point. The Hakea tree is here addressed directly as though it were a person. Indeed, for the black Australians it is a person.

But this first naïve way of regarding objects as living beings is superseded by animism proper. The notion of separable spirits grows up, according to which any object whatsoever may become the habitat of a spirit. The notion of the separable spirit may have originated in a number of different ways. Wundt has given one source when he says, "Das Bild, das der Naturmensch im Traume sieht, ist ihm unmittelbare Wirklichkeit."¹¹ In the mental construction of his world, early man makes no discrimination between dreams, hallucinations, and normal perceptions. The very life which the savage lives, as well as his lack of logical interpretation of normal perceptions, tends to increase the number of sensory and motor automatisms. Hunger and repletion excite remarkably vivid dreams. "After a bootless chase and a long fast he lies down exhausted; and while slumbering, goes through a successful hunt—kills, skins, and cooks his prey and suddenly wakes when about to taste his first morsel."¹² Or having gorged himself with food, and lying in a nightmare, he fancies himself run down by a lion and

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 22 f.

¹¹ William Wundt, *Völkerpsychologie*, Zweiter Band: "Mythus und Religion," Zweiter Teil (Leipzig, 1906), p. 85.

¹² Herbert Spencer, *Principles of Sociology* (New York, 1906), I, 135.

wakes with a start to find himself trembling with fright. Such experiences Wundt and Spencer agree are taken at face value. Again, the savage has lost some relative, or perhaps the chief of the tribe has suddenly died. In his slumbers he sees his departed wife in his lodge with him, or hears his chief urge his braves to war. These dreams are related by the savage not as things which he dreamed, but as things actually seen. Thus one strengthens the other in the belief that realities are seen in dreams. What holds true with reference to dreams is also true in the case of various types of sensory automatisms. Hallucinations, trances, and other mystical experiences are held to have objective value.

It is out of the firm belief in such experiences that the doctrine of the separable soul has probably emerged. The sleeper or the man having the mystical experience repeats to others what he has seen while asleep or in the trance. He says he has been elsewhere: his friends say he has not; and he verifies their testimony by finding himself where he was before his experience. Or the sleeper feels confident that he has seen his wife working about the lodge as he has seen her so often before. But she is dead and buried. The savage does not believe that one or the other of these positions is false. He accepts them both. He himself has a double existence. One of his individualities may leave the other and come back again. His wife has a soul which survives the body and is separable from it, and on occasion may be seen.

That such beliefs are actually held by the savages can be shown by material gathered from nearly all quarters. The negro of West Africa speaks of his dream-soul. "That it is which leaves the body on occasions during sleep, and, wandering off, delights itself by visiting strange lands and strange scenes."¹³ "Among the Seminoles of Florida, when a woman died in childbirth, the infant was held over her face to receive her parting spirit, and thus acquire strength and knowledge for its future use."¹⁴ The Amerinds believe that "there are duplicate souls, one of which remains with the body, while the other is free to depart on excursions during sleep."¹⁵ The Sandwich Islanders say the departed member of a family appears to the survivors sometimes in a dream, and watches over their destinies. Instances similar to these could be multiplied.

¹³ Robert Hamill Nassau, *Fetichism in West Africa* (New York, 1904), p. 54.

¹⁴ Edward B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture* (New York, 1889), I, 433.

¹⁵ Herbert Spencer, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

The idea of duplicate souls—one remaining with the body and the other free to roam where it will—comes to expression in the primitive belief, on the one hand, of the soul having a definite seat in some definite part of the body—liver, fat, heart, blood—and, on the other, in the separable soul variously called “anima” and “umbra.” That the “anima,” or breath-soul, is capable of passing from one individual to another is a firm conviction of primitive man. The holding of the child of the dying Seminole woman so as to inhale the escaping spirit, as cited above, is a case in point. At the death of an ancient Roman, the nearest kinsman leaned over the departing relative to get his last breath. This is manifestly one of the simplest types of spirit possession. It opens avenues for a savage world philosophy. The thing which I wish to emphasize is that it is a product of the social consciousness. The “anima” or “umbra” is always an *alter*, sometimes to be cherished and at other times to be avoided.

This *alter* appears in multitudinous ways in primitive magic and religion. It is not too bold to assume that when primitive man has once attained to the conception of separable spirits in actual communication with himself and others, souls that may take possession of him through the process of inhalation, the natural tendency is progressively to assume more, and the occasions on which spirit possession is considered a fact tend to multiply. It is not here contended that sleep, dreams, death, and automatic experiences of various kinds are the only source of the belief in invisible agency. They manifestly are one agency. For the rest, it is doubtless true, as Professor Thomas asserts, that “a mind which seeks explanation of mysteries and of incidents uncontrolled by human agency is forced to assume the presence of invisible personal agents or spirits.”¹⁶ But it is also true that the material alluded to by Spencer, Tylor, and Wundt is so much material on hand on which the savage probably first draws. At any rate, when the conception of a world of spirits is once attained, primitive man begins to attribute any experience out of the ordinary to spirit possession or the influence of a spirit.

For instance, what we call a nightmare is believed to be a visit from an evil spirit by primitive people. “The demon Koin strives to throttle the dreaming Australian; the evil ‘na’ crouches on the stomach of the Karen; the North American Indian gorged with

¹⁶ Thomas, *Source Book for Social Origins*, p. 733.

feasting is visited by nocturnal spirits; the Caribs subject to hideous dreams, often wake declaring that the demon Maboya had beaten them in their sleep and they could still feel the pain."¹⁷ On one of my numerous trips in the interior of China, my Chinese cook came to me one morning greatly alarmed. "There was a demon in my bedroom last night," he said. "How do you know?" I inquired. "It was in my sleep," he said, "that I felt something heavy bearing down on my chest. I was unable to breathe and woke up. Finally, with one great effort I pushed it from me and lit a match; but I could see nothing. It was a demon. I shall never sleep in that room again."

Automatic speech, automatic deeds of extraordinary strength or skill, uncontrollable rage in battle, epilepsy, even spasmodic contractions and contentless trances are interpreted as spirit possession by the savage.¹⁸ The presence of disquieting dreams during times of sickness, as well as the unnatural tossing while in high fever and the violence of insanity, leads to an association of the disease with evil spirits. Thus disease is quite generally among primitive peoples attributed to possession by evil spirits. The function of ritualism in such a case is, of course, that of exorcism. A Chinese friend has written me as follows regarding disease: "It is generally believed in China that sickness is caused by the evil spirits or demons. In such a case Taoist priests use charms to expel the evil spirit from the person." The type of ceremony varies, but the end sought is the same. The Malay medicine-man invokes the Tiger Spirit to assist him in expelling a rival spirit of less power.¹⁹ Among the Dakotas "the medicine-man's cure consists in reciting charms over the patient, singing *He-le-li-lah*, etc., to the accompaniment of a gourd rattle with beads inside, ceremonially shooting a symbolic bark representation of the intruding creature, sucking over the seat of pain to get the spirit out, and firing guns at it as it is supposed to be escaping."²⁰

It is not necessary to multiply examples. Enough has been said to make it obvious that animism serves to explain the reference to spirits in ancestor worship, in rites designed to exorcise

¹⁷ Tylor, *op. cit.*, II, 189.

¹⁸ George A. Coe, "Automatic Factors in Religious Experiences," art. in Hastings' *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics* (New York).

¹⁹ Skeat, *Malay Magic*, p. 436.

²⁰ Tylor, *op. cit.*, II, 128 f.

evil spirits and influences, and in ceremonies devised to make medicine-men by bringing them into direct communication with the spirit world. Our task is, however, not yet completed. While animatism and animism serve to account for references to living objects and spirits, they do not cover the entire range of higher powers. How are we to account for the passage from polydaemonism to polytheism and from thence to monotheism?²¹ To this question we may give the general answer, that the passage was probably made in various ways. But in whatever way it may have come about, the process was one of further discrimination within the social consciousness.

In the case of the Semites, the early or nomad religion gathered about the tribal god.²² He was believed to be the ancestor of the clan and belonged to that clan alone. There were as many gods of this type as there were clans. The god made the welfare of his tribe his greatest care and entered into all tribal enterprises. The tribal wars were his wars. He had neither help nor sympathy for outsiders. Parallel with this belief in the tribal god and his worship, subsisted a belief in animism as described above. In fact, we may view the whole belief as animism with one particular spirit elevated to the rank of god because he was thought to be the common ancestor. Jahwe, who was probably recognized by the Israelites as a most powerful tribal god, became their national god under the leadership of Moses. There was, however, a frank recognition of other gods. Up to the time of the prophets the Israelites reached nothing higher than monolatry. In the teachings of the prophets Jahwe was socialized to the extent that he became the god of all men. Moreover, he was given an ethical character and thus ethical monotheism was attained. The steps from tribal to national and from national to universal religion, or from polydaemonism to monolatry and from monolatry to monotheism were possible only because there had been a corresponding change in the social consciousness. The deity reflects the social and political condition of his people.

Or the advance from polydaemonism to polytheism may have taken place by the way of fetishism. In its simplest form the fetish is some natural object, as for instance a stock or a stone,

²¹ *I*vide Irving King, *The Development of Religion*, chap. ix.

²² Allan Menzies, *History of Religion* (New York, 1906), p. 158.

which is believed to be the habitat of some spirit. Not infrequently it is a small object hung about the neck. From this stage advance is made by having some particular object consecrated as a fetish by the magic doctor, to whom special influence over the spirit world is attributed. The purpose in all this is to secure a definite type of control over the environment. When the fetish ceases to bring about the desired result, it is discarded. By some it has been supposed that fetishism is peculiar to Africa and that there it is the result of religious degeneration; but it may be accepted as a general statement that wherever animism is found, and we have reason to believe that this is more or less developed among all primitive peoples, there fetishism in some form or other appears. The principle of fetishism is essentially that of idolatry, that is to say, an object is viewed as the habitat of a spirit. In case the polydaemonistic spirit inhabiting a particular object proves to be extraordinarily efficacious in bringing about results, it becomes invested with great prestige. This would be especially true if the spirit is believed to be that of a great leader or of a common ancestor. Gradually hallowed by custom, it becomes an object of awe, reverence, and worship—an idol rather than a fetish. Objects similar to the one inhabited by the spirit are made and the influence of the spirit is thought to extend to these. This gives full-fledged idolatry. By almost imperceptible gradations the spirit has become a god. Is it not probable that in some such way as this early Buddhism—a religion without a god—gradually developed into an elaborate system of idolatry in Japan and China? The basis on which any such development could transpire would be that the spirit becomes efficacious in the realization of group values.

Again, it is quite clear that certain of the great gods have developed out of primitive man's attitude toward the heavenly bodies and the phenomena of the weather. These are first regarded as living. Each gradually acquires a character of its own, in accordance with the value it represents to the group. Heaven becomes a father, the earth the corresponding mother. The reason is not hard to surmise. The storm is a god and the dawn a goddess. The various, thus personified nature gods are surrounded with myths and legends. Each is confined to his particular sphere. Polytheism is the result. Henotheism may easily follow and finally monotheism.

It is not our purpose, in giving the above description of the passage from polydaemonism to polytheism and from there on up to monotheism, to assert that these are the only ways in which this could take place. Nor do we wish to maintain that any one line was of necessity rigorously carried out. There were doubtless varying circumstances. Any particular transition would have its own peculiarities and its own character. This much would, however, stand, that the method of transition was concrete. It came out of man's effort to meet his everyday needs and should not be conceived of as having come through any vague sense of the infinite or of a mysterious power.

And now in closing this chapter, we pass once more to the ceremony. Instinctive activity is man's primitive endowment and determines the direction of his efforts. The medium in which this takes place is the social group to which he belongs. As long as instincts function smoothly no reorganization of conduct is effected except through chance variation. On this level whatever rituals there may be (I have been unable to find any) bear no trace of thought. When, however, a problematic situation arises, when the crisis comes, and attention brings about a reorganization of conduct, then we have a thought process, though of a very crude type. The content of the new reaction is determined by the way in which attention utilizes the native endowment of instincts and impulses, the social consciousness, and past experience in bringing about satisfactory control. There is no other material at hand that can be utilized by the savage. In case of disease, for instance, primitive man cannot base a cure upon a scientific knowledge of anatomy, physiology, and materia medica, when for him the ailment is due to possession by an evil spirit. He naturally resorts to some method of exorcism. In any given instance the fortunate or satisfactory reaction is repeated when a similar occasion presents itself, and so becomes a group habit. Hallowed by custom, it becomes the prescribed method of procedure and thereby is ritualized.

As regards the development of old rituals—cults thoroughly habituated and hence on a level with instinct and impulse—reorganization can take place through chance variation or through a thought process. Our present-day rituals are the result of long and gradual development. The process has, on the whole, not

been that of consciously originating ceremonies, but of progressively meeting the returning needs of life. From this point of view, ritualism is the unconscious product of man's effort to meet his needs and be at home in the world. It is a part of the organized social life into which each individual is born and to which he conforms in an unconscious way. If the individual becomes really conscious of it, it is usually when a problematic situation arises. He may then become the dynamic center of another reconstruction.

CHAPTER VI

THE RELATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RITUAL TO CHANGES WITHIN THE SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS

I

If our description of the ceremony so far has been correct, it follows that the rituals tend to develop according as the social consciousness of the group concerned changes. As long as the social consciousness remains fixed upon the same objects in the same way, there is like permanence in the ritualistic observances. But let the change once come, and old habits are of necessity modified and frequently entirely supplanted.

There are evidently a number of situations which would be conducive to profound changes in the social consciousness. All would fall under the head of crises discussed in the fourth chapter. Whenever there is a transition from one type of life to another, from a nomadic to an agricultural, for instance, or from a tribal régime to a national government, we have instances of a corresponding change in the social consciousness. There is a reorganization of the relation of the members of the group, not only to one another and to other groups, but also to the spirits and deities. Some of the latter will fall into the background; others will get a prominent place in the pantheon. The character of all is likely to assume a different aspect. That the overt expression in rites and ceremonies should not change under such circumstances is, of course, inconceivable.

Then, we have the typical situation of the great man in the group. A Xenophanes, a Micah, a Gautama, a Jesus, rises up in arms against current conceptions of religion and morality. He becomes a thought stimulator, a leader of men. He creates a new type of social consciousness. Such a typical thought situation naturally tends to dissolve old habits and *ipso facto* cannot but more or less profoundly affect the ritual.

In the third place, any great calamity that befalls the group will bring about changes in its social consciousness. The same is true of any special streak of good fortune. The inefficient god is relegated to ignominy, the favorite deity is extolled and

made the center of elaborate worship. The conquered gods become demons, the conquering tribal deity becomes a national god.

In the fourth place, abstracting certain objects from the general field of consciousness and investing them with purely physical attributes takes them from the realm of the social and places them into the category of the mechanical. Mystery is resolved into force; teleology into mechanism. Movement is now no longer invariably associated with life. It may be strictly mechanical. The rise of the scientific attitude in its various manifestations means the death of many old notions. In the case of disease, for instance, demon possession and its cure, exorcism, could no longer hold their own when a scientific treatment of disease was discovered. Enter pathogenic bacilli, exeunt demons and foreign substances such as crystals.

Finally, the rational socialization of the universe of social objects by the group invests the social object itself with an orderly, law-abiding character. This is a late product and is to be carefully distinguished from the naïve primitive social consciousness which is a result of the normal functioning of man's native endowment of instincts and impulses. The type of social consciousness here referred to is built through deliberate reflection upon the native endowment. The god is no longer thought to be arbitrary and capricious. His conduct is rational. He is completely socialized. He seeks the welfare of all. Not ritual but rational conduct—i.e., the moral act—is the standard by which he judges. If the rituals are retained it is not because of the effect they have upon the higher power, but because of their influence upon the participant. It is well known that the initiation ceremonies (I refer particularly to such as take the religious character) of modern secret societies are designed to that end.

II

If now we turn to a description of the general stages through which the ritual passes in its development, we find the following: The primitive ritual has its origin as the accompanying overt expression of a naïve and relatively indiscriminating type of consciousness.¹ Primitive man sees that particular

¹ Miss Strong has defended the same position with reference to prayer in her monograph on the psychology of prayer (Anna Louise Strong, *A Consideration of Prayer from the Standpoint of Social Psychology*, 1908).

events follow upon certain actions. His conclusion is that a reproduction of the antecedents will mediate the consequences. Sometimes he is right, and at others wrong. He is unable because of lack of adequate technique to distinguish that which is essential from that which is merely incidental, or that which is social from that which is physical. He believes that the order and success of his world depend upon the accuracy with which he is able to reproduce that which tradition teaches him to be the cause. The slightest variation in the prescribed method is believed to be disastrous. Thus, rain will not follow upon the performance of the rain ceremony unless all the traditional minutiae have been carefully and literally carried out. This lack of logical analysis is one of the most potent factors in the development of the most elaborate rituals, often extending over days and sometimes over weeks and months. When at the time of a crisis a new element is added, the old remains with but slight modifications. W. W. Skeat has called attention to this in his *Malay Magic*. Over the substratum of original primitive rituals, we find a veneer of Hinduism and Mohammedanism. Likewise in China, one and the same individual often sees no inconsistency in being a Confucianist, a Taoist, a Buddhist, and a Christian. Anything that works in the social environment is *ipso facto* satisfactory. The writer at one time had a coolie, Lao Wang, employed as gardener, who one day came to him with the announcement that he wished to join the church. "Why?" I asked. "Because I am working for you," he answered. He was desirous of so adapting himself to his environment that he might reap every benefit. He was a typical child of nature. The incident of being employed by a European was the occasion for that crude or incomplete type of thought which adapts itself to the new situation without recognizing any of the deeper logical and moral implications of the act. The chief objection to such primitive types of thought is just this lack of adequate logical connection.

The ritual, we have heretofore asserted, is the outcome of primitive man's effort at control. With him it is a practical affair. The control sought is over his world. The ritual is not restricted to some aspects of life: it pre-empt's the entire realm of experience. At this undifferentiated stage it covers everything. Religion, philosophy, science, medicine, ethics, and the techniques of everyday life, all are within its borders. We may assert with

confidence that by far the larger number of ceremonies are approved group habits. But that this is not universally true is attested by the clandestine manner in which some magical ceremonies are performed.

We may go a step farther in our analysis by pointing out that the primitive rituals contain both the thou-shalt and the thou-shalt-not. They are both religious and irreligious, moral and immoral. The religious elements are incorporated in those which are performed with the approval of the group: all others are irreligious. The same is true with reference to the moral and the immoral. That the entire group should participate as a man is not necessary, but its approval is indispensable to religion and morality. The "black art" rituals performed without the approval of the group are examples of irreligious and immoral ceremonies.

Any really profound change in the attitude toward ritualism depends upon further differentiation of the objects of consciousness. The difficulty does not lie in adding to the rituals, for the dominant tendency is progressively to ritualize. The Jews of the time of Jesus are a case in point. The real problem lies in eliminating certain objects and situations from the ritual. This state of affairs is reached when logical or scientific implications are comprehended at least to the extent that the efficiency of the ceremony is critically examined, or when the value of individual experience takes such a place in the life of the group that his manner of reacting is no longer definitely delimited. Individual freedom is not the virgin soil of ritualism.

As soon, then, as discrimination begins, inroad is made on the field of ritualism. We may take the rain ceremony as an instance. As long as the rain is viewed as a social object which can be influenced by direct appeal either through pantomimicry or language, the ritual is the normal method of control. Likewise, as long as the prescientific stage of reasoning from pure analogy prevails, the ritual subsists. The successful act and its concomitants are incorporated into the ritual until it sometimes takes days to perform the ceremony. When, however, the utter uselessness of all these ceremonial performances in bringing about rain is realized, when scientific research has brought to light

the inanity of any such method of control, the ritual dies a natural death.

The thing essential for such a breakdown is that the group become conscious of the new situation. In this the authorities and leaders of the group may either render great assistance or materially hinder the course of events. The Chinese in many parts of the empire have not yet become cognizant of the situation and are not infrequently heard performing the rain ceremony or the ceremony for the cessation of rain. A large percentage of the officials know well that such ceremonies have no rain-determining values, but they increase their prestige over the people by performing the ceremony as soon as the barometer indicates the desired change. Let the group once become thoroughly inoculated with the new attitude toward rain, and the ceremony will disappear. This particular ceremony is, of course, an obvious case and one comparatively easy to deal with. The scientific attitude has, however, made such inroads that it has pretty well disposed not only of this but of all rituals designed for the control of the physical environment.

Likewise, if we turn to the development of individual freedom and of the recognition of the value of individual experience, which are indispensable accompaniments of scientific progress, we find a tendency to sever connection with old group standards and to contend for autonomic action. That was the motivating spirit of Martin Luther and his sympathizers in the Reformation. Its success meant a break with the ritual of the Roman Catholic church. On the other hand, if one would see for himself just how strong the hold of ritualism is upon a people that has not yet passed from religious serfdom into religious autonomy, he will find a superb example in a comparatively high stage of culture in the famous City of Seven Hills. Religion and ritualism are there synonymous. If, perchance, he should find himself at the *Scala Sancta*, he will be impressed with the fact, as he sees young and old slowly and laboriously climbing the stairs on hands and knees, that almost anything can be made to have religious significance, if only it has the sanction and approval of the group, and that the most unmoral act can be given tremendous moral value.

The third stage in the development of ritualism is reached when the group has added the conception of a completely social-

ized God and the ideal of a completely socialized humanity to the principle of autonomy and to the scientific attitude which culls away any attempt to attain physical results from the ritual. The ceremony then loses its obligatory character as regards the deity. It is performed for subjective rather than for objective results. It may at times fall away entirely. The real object of the ritual, in case it subsists, is the attainment of a wider, more social self. The *alter*, usually in the form of the deity, is an organization of content not included in the self.² The ritual is performed, on the one hand, to make that content one's own. In that aspect it becomes contemplative. On the other hand, the ritual may be performed in order to develop capacity for moral action. Contemplation here gives way to a desire to act—to enter into a more social relationship with other selves. Both aspects are present in the rituals of modern Christianity. It is not necessary, however, that the content of the aesthetic consciousness or the stimulus to social activity be presented in the ritualistic form. The ritual, now no longer thought to be as essential as in primitive society, is simply a convenient instrument of social control.

² Strong, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

CHAPTER VII

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RITUAL ILLUSTRATED

In the preceding chapter we gave a general description of situations that produce profound changes in the social consciousness, and hence tend to modify the ritual. To this we added a sketch of the general stages through which ritualism passes in its development. In the present chapter we will attempt to make the point of view maintained more concrete. To this end, we will examine the life and the ritual of the Semites, first in their primitive or nomadic condition, and then in the various stages of their development as exemplified in the Old Testament. From this we will make the passage into New Testament ritualism as manifested in the Eucharist, and trace modifications of the latter in the Christian church. We are defending the thesis that the ritual tends to change as the social consciousness changes, and that profound changes in the ritual are to be attributed directly to changes within the social consciousness.

It is not necessary to go into a detailed discussion regarding the cradle of the Semites. Whether they originally came from Babylonia as von Kremer,¹ Guidi, and Hommel advocate, or from Africa as Jastrow, Brinton, Palgrave, and Keane believe, or were indigenous to Arabia as Sayce, Sprenger, and others maintain, is of no special importance for this study. If the Semites were not originally at home in Arabia, their migration to it took place very early. "Any statement of it in years is a mere guess." It is certain that "the peculiar conditions of life which the Arabian desert and oases have presented for millenniums are the matrix in which Semitic character as it is known to us was born."² Barton in his *Semitic Origins* has called attention to the central place of the palm tree in the semi-agricultural nomadic life of the clans. The influence and sanctity of the oases is probably preserved in the "high places" so peculiar to Semitic religious worship in widely separated localities.

¹ George Aaron Barton, *A Sketch of Semitic Origins* (New York, 1902), chap. i.

² *Ibid.*, p. 28.

From Arabia migrations took place into lands occupied by the Semites during the historical period. The Babylonians, Aramaeans, and Canaanites first departed for new fields. They probably first settled in Babylonia and the neighboring regions. Later this body of emigrants was divided by further migrations, the Canaanites settling in Palestine, where the Israelites later found them, and the Assyrians choosing what was later known as Assyria. The main body in Central Arabia also lost clans through migration southward, when a portion of them crossed into Africa and settled in Abyssinia.

The early Semites were essentially nomads. As the Israelites were Semites, we have no reason for viewing them in any way essentially different from all the rest of their kinsmen. They, too, were nomads with manners, customs, and disposition like the others. The chief care of the ancient Semitic nomads was their flocks. Some sort of social organization was indispensable to insure safety from marauders and wild animals, and to secure co-operation in obtaining food. The clan, both W. Robertson Smith and George Aaron Barton are agreed, was the earliest social unit,³ and was organized for the purpose of protection and co-operation. There is a reason to believe that this is a justifiable position, not only for historic times but also far back into pre-historic times. The nucleus of such a clan was generally a group of brothers and sisters who constituted a household and were bound together either through a tie of actual blood relationship or through a blood covenant.⁴ The god of the group, who was really

³ W. Robertson Smith, *The Religion of the Semites*, p. 35; Barton, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

⁴ H. Clay Trumbull in his book *The Blood Covenant* (New York, 1885), pp. 5 f., describes a later development of the rite as it was consummated in a village at the base of the mountains of Lebanon. Two young men wished to enter into a covenant relation. Relatives and friends were congregated in the open place at the village fountain. Public announcement of the purpose and reasons for entering into this compact was made by the young men, and duplicate copies were made of these declarations and one was given to each. These having been duly signed by themselves and several witnesses, one of the young men opened a vein in the arm of the other with a small knife and by means of a quill inserted into the wound sucked the living blood. The blood which had adhered to the knife-blade was wiped on one of the duplicate covenant records. The same ceremony was then performed by the other party and the knife wiped on the other paper. Each blood-marked paper was folded separately and sewed up in a small amulet, to be worn by the covenant brothers.

a totem, was the common ancestor of the clan.⁵ The clan was made up of its god, the members of the group, and their animals, "all of whom were akin to one another."⁶ Each member of the clan had this one god as his own, though the reality of other gods was not denied. The link between the god and his clansmen was of the strongest character.

The primitive Semitic clans were small and continually at war with one another. In their various enterprises the god joined with them. Their wars were his wars; and when any of them were injured or slain, he assisted in the necessary act of retaliation.⁷ In return for this, he had indisputable claim to the reverence and service of the community. The relationship existing between god and worshiper was interpreted on the analogy of human relationships.

In the fifth chapter we have noted that primitive man's conception of nature is dominantly social. He views everything as living. The Semites were in this respect no different from other primitive peoples. They believed that they were surrounded by jinn or spirits, as is shown in the account of Jacob's dream. What is more, the gods of the primitive Semitic community had a definite relation to some material objects. They were thought to have their home at certain fixed sanctuaries; and their power and authority were believed to be restricted to circumscribed areas. Thus in the case of Jahwe, Sinai, in the land of the Kenites,⁸ where Moses first met him, was his dwelling-place. The dwelling-place of the god was called a "high place." Here the goddess, for the Semites were extremely interested in sexual life, also had her abode. Barton suggests that the origin of god and goddess is to be traced to the culture of the date palm in the oases, which would mean that primitive Semitic religion was organized on the analogies of the life of the community.⁹ The deities were believed to be the source of fertility and life (plant, animal, and human). They were not ubiquitous, but were confined to definite areas and particular groups.

⁵ Menzies, *History of Religion*, p. 158; *Semitic Origins*, p. 35.

⁶ *Semitic Origins*, p. 81.

⁷ Menzies, *op. cit.*, p. 158.

⁸ *Semitic Origins*, p. 267. The Kenites are also known as Midianites. The relation of Moses to the Midianites is well known to every Bible student. His wife was a Midianite, and it was among them that Moses found refuge after he had slain the Egyptian.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

Such, with minor variations, was the social consciousness of the early Semites. The community consisted of god, goddess, the actual members of the group, and the animals belonging to the group. All were bound together in one social bond. The relationship was not that of an outraged and angry god to a disloyal and depraved community, but rather one of fellowship and co-operation in the affairs of life.

What type of ritual, let the reader ask himself, would be natural under such circumstances? Is it reasonable to expect that a high sense of sin and unworthiness be revealed? Manifestly not, for the god is just as much a member of the community as any human being, nor is it conceivable that he could be completely alienated from it. The normal type of sacrifice under such circumstances would be an expression of fellowship, and of the intimacy of the bond existing between the god and his clansmen. The precise nature would depend upon environment and the techniques acquired. That this is true to fact is abundantly evidenced by the result of modern scholarship. Subjoined is what Menzies finds:

Sacrifice is not domestic but takes place at the spot where the god is thought to reside, or where the symbol stands which represents him. Usually this was an upright monolith, such as is found in every part of the world, and the central act of the sacrifice consisted in applying the blood of the new-slain victim to this stone. The blood was thus brought near to the god, the clansmen also may have touched the blood at the same time; and the act meant that the god and the tribesmen, all coming into contact with the blood, which originally perhaps was that of the animal totem of the clan, declared that they were of the same blood and renewed the bond which connected them with each other. A further feature of early Semitic sacrifice is also that the slaughter and the blood ceremony are succeeded by a banquet, at which the god is thought to sit at table with his clients, his share being exposed before him on the stone or altar. . . . Many examples may be collected in the early historical books of the Old Testament of sacrifices which are at the same time social and festive occasions; in fact, in early Israel every act of slaughter was a sacrifice, and every sacrifice a banquet. The people dance and make merry before their god, of whose favour they have just become assured once more by the act of communion they have observed. The undertaking they have on hand is hallowed by his approval, so they can boldly advance to it; the corporate spirit of the tribe is quickened by renewed contact with its head; all thoughts of care are far away; the religious act makes the worshippers simply and unaffectedly happy, if it does not even fill them with an orgiastic ecstasy.¹⁰

¹⁰ Menzies, *op. cit.*, pp. 162 f.

Karl Marti has called attention to the fact that the religion of the Old Testament passed through four periods, which he distinguishes as the Nomad religion, the Peasant religion, the religion of the Prophets, and the Legal religion. In the first or nomadic period, religion corresponded in all its essentials to the description given above. We have simply the expression in rites and ceremonies of the social consciousness of the early Semites. If, now, in order to have something as definite and concrete as possible along the line of Semitic development, we turn our attention specifically to the Israelites, we find that a profound change took place in their manner of living and their view of the world when they made the transition from a pastoral to an agricultural stage of culture.¹¹ This was effected when they took possession of Canaan. Under the leadership of Moses at the foot of Mount Sinai, the various tribes which had been in bondage in Egypt were bound together into one organization. They accepted as their god the Kenite Jahwe, whom they believed to be their deliverer. As the Kenites were a clan whose origin was more directly Arabian, the Israelitish clans were thus brought under the direct influence of early Semitic ideas, and under such circumstances the tendency would be not away from but in the direction of primitive institutions. The religion they had under the leadership of Moses was nomadic.

When they entered Canaan they immediately came into contact with a people who spoke a language similar to their own. The tribes of Canaan were originally nomadic like themselves, but had long since advanced to agriculture and the building of cities. The Babylonian cuneiform writing was known to them, and elements of Egyptian civilization had also been assimilated.¹² Their religion was no less different from that of the Israelites than their civilization. The change from a nomadic to an agricultural life had made a reconstruction of religion inevitable. They carried on the worship of Baal, the male god, and of a female deity in the "high places" scattered over Palestine, where were found an upright stone called "Massebah" and a massive tree trunk with some of its branches intact called "Ashera." These were thought to be the abode of the male and the female deities.¹³ The name Baal is not

¹¹ *Vide* chap. vi, p. 57, of this thesis.

¹² Karl Marti, *The Religion of the Old Testament* (New York, 1907), pp. 74 f.

¹³ Menzies, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

to be construed as a proper name: its original meaning was simply lord or master. There were many Baals, therefore, of which each particular one was the lord of the soil belonging to the worshipping community, as well as the author of its fertility. The goddess represented the principle of increase.

The act of worship was distinguished by its "cheerful and festal nature. The offerings were fruits of the soil—corn, wine, oil, fruits, etc., which constituted the feast at which, in accordance with the old Semitic custom, the worshipers were seated around the festive board—the god their honored guest."¹⁴ He was to enjoy the rich blessings but as *lord of the fields* and not as clansman.

It is evident from the above sketch that in the course of time the Canaanites had introduced into their ritual many elements from their agricultural life. This may seem like so much veneer on old forms; but in the realm of the psychic one layer cannot be superimposed on another without profoundly affecting both. Vestiges of the old continue to survive, but they are rewoven and reconstructed. When the Canaanite feasted his god on corn, wine, and fruits, he was dealing with articles not generally in the hands of nomads. The typical nomadic sacrifice was that of an animal. Moreover, the sacrifices of the early nomadic Semites was an act of sacramental communion. The group met with its god "and all eating and drinking together, assurances were given and received that the good understanding still continued which bound the tribesmen to their god and to each other."¹⁵ When the Canaanites became prosperous agricultural people and the Baals lords of the land and the sky, the relation between the worshiper and the god was entirely different. A profound change had taken place within the social consciousness. The farmers felt the necessity of being on good terms with the givers of corn, wine, and other produce of the field. The continuation of these favors from the deity depended upon a friendly relationship on the part of the god. A poor year would produce an emotional effect of a profound nature on the farmers by making them feel that the controlling deity had withheld the increase; and as a result sacrifices would be increased and the conception thereof be changed. The sacrifice, no longer a sacramental communion, became a gift to which the deity was entitled. "With conceptions such as these many rites and ceremonies will

¹⁴ Hiram C. Brown, *The Historical Basis of Religion* (Boston, 1906), p. 175.

¹⁵ Menzies, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

have come into use, on the due performance of which depended the enjoyment of the fruits of the earth."¹⁶

Such was the nature of the people with whom the Israelites came into contact when they took possession of Canaan. We ask: What was the effect? A long and bloody conflict was waged with the occupants of the land, out of which the Israelites came forth as victors. This was not, however, accomplished by partially exterminating the people and for the rest destroying every vestige of former times. The social consciousness of the Israelites themselves was profoundly changed. Israel overcame the Canaanite religion by taking over the religion of the conquered and fusing it with its own. "The nomad religion became a peasant religion and Jahwe the God of Israel, the Lord of Palestine."¹⁷ What is more, Jahwe in this new capacity became the deity of a typical agricultural people. He was honored with the cultus of the early Baal worship. The "high places" became his places of worship. Surely our thesis that the ritual tends to change with the changed social consciousness has proven to be true in this instance. Jahwe has moved from his original home on Mount Sinai to the "high places" of Baal. He is still the god of the Israelites, but in the capacity of lord of the land. Not communion and fellowship, but the payment of a just obligation, was the great thought back of the ritual. The Israelitish peasant had no more right to appear before Jahwe without the sacrificial gift than he had before any human potentate. In fact, no better figure can be applied to Jahwe during the period when Israel was a kingdom than that of king. Religion was strictly a community affair. The deity took no special interest in the individual; the welfare of the nation was his concern. When the individual needed counsel or comfort, he sought the wizard and the soothsayer, and like every other primitive man believed implicitly in magical ceremonies and influences.

In the eighth century B.C. we have a period of protest against, and of reconstruction of, old conceptions. Though the movement as a whole was not successful in its pre-exilic aspects, it shows that socialization of the deity, and the emergence of an effort to secure proper evaluation of the individual experience, tend to break down old ceremonies.¹⁸ I refer to the prophets whose teachings

¹⁶ Marti, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 90.

¹⁸ Discrimination is here setting in. *Vide* chap. vi, p. 90, of this thesis.

stand out in sharp contrast to the popular religion of Israel. The prophets were not foretellers, nor were they soothsayers and wizards. They were forth-tellers, intensely practical men, "enlightened and devoted patriots, social and ethical reformers, spiritual teachers."¹⁹ They made the passage from monolatry to monotheism. Theirs was the first real monotheism that appeared in the history of Israel and, with the exception of the Egyptian monotheism in the time of Pharaoh Amenhotep IV, probably the first in the world. There is this great difference between Chuen-aten's and that of the prophets, that the former was produced through syncretism of Egypt's various deities, whereas the prophet's monotheism was ethical. Jahwe of the prophets took no delight in multiplicity of sacrifices. An ethical god, a social god who had risen above the mere humoring of a people whose cultus made room for drunkenness and license, needed no sacrifice. "I hate, I despise your feasts, and I will take no delight in your solemn assemblies,"²⁰ was the message he sent through Amos. "To what purpose is the multitude of your sacrifices unto me? saith the Lord; . . . bring no more vain oblations: incense is an abomination unto me; the new moons and sabbaths, the calling of assemblies, I cannot away with; it is iniquity, even the solemn meeting."²¹ "What doth the Lord require of thee," cried Micah, "but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?"²² That type of social consciousness, if once it had become dominant, would have brought to an end the peasant ritual. The purpose of the deity was conceived as the establishing of righteousness and goodness on earth. It could not be tied up arbitrarily with the welfare of the Israelites, for he was the God of all men. His high ethical purpose was individual and universal. The individual was responsible for his own conduct. Salvation was for all. "Look unto me and be ye saved, all the ends of the earth, for I am God and there is none else."²³

The prophetic ideals did not become popular before the exile. The prophets suffered much persecution; for the mass of the people was still clinging to old institutions, and was unable to discern deep ethical and social values. The prophets gathered about

¹⁹ Charles Foster Kent, *The Origin and Permanent Value of the Old Testament* (New York, 1906), p. 113. *Vide* chap. vi, p. 57. of this thesis.

²⁰ Amos 5:21.

²² Micah 6:8.

²¹ Isaiah 1:11, 13.

²³ Isaiah 45:22.

them little groups of faithful adherents and of persons more or less interested. Just what would have come out of this movement no one can estimate, for a great calamity befell the Hebrews. They were vanquished in war and led off to Babylon by Nebuchadnezzar. As it is, we must seek for its influence in any reconstruction that might emerge out of the calamity. In passing, this fact is noticeable, that the very nature of the prophetic message was such that a sympathizer would find vindication of its truth in the calamity itself. That Jahwe should allow his own nation to be led off into captivity would indicate that he did not really consider himself as inseparably bound to one people, or that he was too weak and inefficient to hold his own. The latter was inconceivable from the Hebrew point of view.

That a reconstruction would follow as closely as possible in the wake of Israel's captivity was to be expected. The spirit of the prophets was not dead. The Babylonian exile was more than a crisis. It was short, but not too short to effect a fundamental transformation in the political, social, and religious character of the Jews.²⁴ What the masses refused to do while they were prosperous in Palestine, they now gladly did. The calm and leisure of the exile gave them time to meditate and opened their ears to the messages of their prophetic teachers. "Torn from their old associations, they no longer felt the spell of the high places and heathen customs." They began to look upon the captivity as Jahwe's punishment for their sins, and longed to be reinstated in his favor. No keen analysis is needed to see that such a type of social consciousness is the matrix out of which piacular sacrifices are born. Add to this the fact that the Babylonians were constantly offering propitiatory sacrifices to their deities,²⁵ and that the Jews knew and saw this, and the typical situation for the operation of suggestion is present. Ritual and religion would crowd all else from the focus of attention to the fringe of consciousness. Atonement, absolution, expiatory sacrifice, would hold the center.

In the fifth century, with the return of the Jews to Jerusalem, the evolution was complete. Under the protection of the Persian government, Nehemiah introduced the law or Torah. Thereby the will of Jahwe was accepted as reduced to writing, and the Torah

²⁴ Charles Foster Kent, *A History of the Jewish People* (New York, 1899), p. 93.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

became strictly regulative. From now on the Jews had a book religion; they were under the yoke of the law. The individual was not supposed to think for himself and by so doing to determine right and wrong conduct. The Torah was proclaimed to be a perfect and complete revelation, and matters of conduct were decided by reference to it. Legal rather than ethical conduct was thus attained. Jewish life, as anyone can easily see for himself by reading Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy, was limited on every hand by ritual. In all this such conceptions as sin, uncleanness, atonement, stood out in proportion far beyond all else.

The fundamental notion upon which the ceremonial law was based is that in the domain of Israel, Jahwe's own people, everything without exception belonged and was thus consecrated to him alone. This held good, accordingly, of all space and time and of all property and life.²⁶ Had this thought been carried out to its logical consequences, it would have meant that all life should be brought to Jahwe in sacrifice, and thereby the continued existence of Israel would have been made impossible. In the Torah, Jahwe ordained that only a portion be given to him, but by this due (*terumah*) symbolical expression was given to the confession that Jahwe was lord of everything. E. Kautzsch has traced out this situation with reference to holy places, holy times, holy persons, and the hallowed character of Israel's things.²⁷ Under the last the life of each individual was included.

The sacrificial system with its sacred history took the central place in the Torah. Of sacrifice there were three kinds: the burnt-offering, the peace-offering, and the piacular sacrifice. The underlying thought was, that for all the blessings of life man should be grateful to Jahwe who gave them, and that, where the good will of the deity had departed from the individual because of transgression of the divine laws, the individual should give his very best to bring about a renewal of the covenant fellowship with his God. The Levitical system assigned the greatest importance to the piacular sacrifice. This was preceded

by a verbal confession of guilt, uttered by the worshiper leaning upon the victim's head. The chief feature, however, was the ceremonial sprinkling of the blood at the spots to which belonged different degrees of sanctity,

²⁶ E. Kautzsch, "The Religion of Israel," art. in Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible* (extra vol.; New York, 1904), p. 716.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 717 f.

implying different stages of nearness to God. . . . In the case of the sin offering, it was solemnly sprinkled either on the horns of the altar or (when carried into the "Holy of Holies" on the Day of Atonement) upon and before the mercy seat. . . . The offender relied for renewal of covenant fellowship with God on the blood (i.e. on the life) of the victim which Jahveh accepted as substitute for the life of the offerer.²⁸

The social consciousness out of which such rituals emerged was radically different from that of the nomadic and peasant religions. The sense of sin and guilt was everywhere in evidence. The deity, far from being an ancestor, was a powerful god so much to be feared that his name must not be spoken. The most that the individual and the community could hope for was to secure and hold his good will by sacrificing according to the method prescribed by himself.

When a religion becomes stereotyped in laws reduced to writing and regarded as strictly regulative, changes take place very slowly, if at all. Within the religion itself it is next to impossible to pass into anything higher. The laws are so apt to have a restraining influence upon the development of a higher type of social consciousness that nothing but force of circumstances can bring about any change whatever. This is precisely the condition in which the Jews were and are with their legal religion. Their religion today testifies to the powerful influence of the Torah. In case an influential individual breaks away from the formalism of the prescribed religion and gathers a group of disciples about him, reform and change may take place in spite of legalism.

Such an individual was Jesus of Nazareth. His so-called Sermon on the Mount and other declarations show him forth as radically opposed to the petty regulations of the law. He seized upon the prophetic movement and emphasized love, righteousness, and purity, as over against a ritualistic religion. "Be ye therefore perfect even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect."²⁹ For him God was a kind and beneficent father who "maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust,"³⁰ and who is "kind unto the unthankful and evil."³¹ The greatest of all commandments, those on which the

²⁸ R. L. Ottley, *The Religion of Israel* (Cambridge, 1905), p. 143.

²⁹ Matt. 5:48.

³⁰ Matt. 5:45.

³¹ Luke 6:35.

Law and the Prophets hang, are, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul and with all thy mind," and "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." The work of Jesus was in the direction of completely socializing God, and placing this God as the ideal which man should strive to realize.

On the night before his crucifixion, Jesus ate a meal with his twelve disciples in a room in Jerusalem. At this his last meal with them, knowing that the crisis was at hand, he "took bread, and gave thanks, and brake it, and gave unto them saying, This is my body which is given for you: this do in remembrance of me."³² That in this act he wished to institute a ceremony like the present Lord's Supper is not at all clear, especially when we remember his anti-ritualistic attitude; but that it resulted in the sacrament is generally conceded. Harnack holds that "Jesus instituted a meal to commemorate his death."³³

It is probable that in the early days of Christianity every meal at which Christians met was hallowed by eucharistic acts.³⁴ In these times a solemn remembrance of the death of Jesus and the interpretation of that death as sacrificial were the chief things in the eucharistic act. This would indicate that the chief reference, in addition to the immediate one of the death of Jesus, was backward to the sacrificial element in the legal religion. Jesus was viewed as the great sacrifice for the sins of the whole world. It is but natural that with the sacrificial system still in vogue in the temple, the death of Jesus should be related in some way to the sacrificial act. In so far, then, as the conception of an angry God had not been outgrown, a sacrifice of that kind seemed natural; on the other hand, in so far as this God was a real father, he had sent his own son to consummate the salvation. The situation is, of course, paradoxical, and shows that the God had not yet become fully socialized.

At first, the eucharistic act and the Agape were held together. There was probably a daily celebration of both.³⁵ We may consider

³² Luke 22:19, 20.

³³ G. Wanhope Stewart, "Harnack, Jülicher and Spitta on the Lord's Supper," *Expositor* (Fifth Series), III, 43-61, 86-102; see p. 48.

³⁴ J. A. Robinson, "Eucharist," art. in *Encyclopaedia Biblica* (New York, 1901), II, col. 1424.

³⁵ "Lord's Supper," art. in *Cyclopedia of Biblical, Theological and Ecclesiastical Literature* (New York, 1891), V, 511.

it simply as a common meal with emphasis upon it as love feast and Eucharist. The Agape was not really a vital element in the eucharistic act; either could exist without the other. As early as the time of Paul the two began to be separated. The Agape became more and more localized. Evil results were seen to come out of it. Discouraged by bishops and forbidden by councils, it died out almost entirely. The Lord's Supper also underwent changes. New names—Eucharist, Sacrifice, Altar, Mass, Holy Mysteries—gathered around it, and new acts were added to the rite. The celebration at the high altar of a basilica in the fourth century was so different from the original institution that it was difficult to recognize common elements.

J. A. Magni has published an article on the "Ethnological Background of the Eucharist"³⁶ in which he takes the stand that Christianity is a marvelous synthesis of Semitic, Greek, and possibly Indian thought.³⁷ It would be passing strange, he thinks, if the mystery cults in vogue when Christianity was born and characterized by the eucharistic act had not been at least in part adopted by the Christians. Hatch has also called attention to the influence of the Greek mysteries on the Lord's Supper.³⁸ The whole is, of course, an excellent example of the subtle influence of suggestion. Men cannot intermingle as the early Christians did with other nations without being profoundly influenced. The Eucharist in its more developed forms has not only a reference back to Semitic sacrifice; it is an expression of contemporaneous attitudes common to the peoples concerned. It is not necessary for a rational explanation to go to the extreme to which Percy Gardner has gone in his book, *The Origin of the Lord's Supper* (London, 1893), when he asserts that Paul became the real originator of the rite by turning a pagan ceremony to Christian use.³⁹ Social psychology is satisfied when

³⁶ *American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education*, IV (No. 1-2), March, 1910.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

³⁸ Edwin Hatch, *The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church* (London, 1891), pp. 300 f.

³⁹ R. R. Falconer, "Lord's Supper," art. in *Hastings' Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels* (New York, 1908), II, 61; J. A. Magni, "The Ethnological Background of the Eucharist," *American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education*, IV (No. 1-2), 23.

it has shown that the particular rite is an overt expression of the social consciousness of the group concerned. The simple fact that "the Mithraic sacrament consisted of elements bread and wine"⁴⁰ would tend to give these elements in the Lord's Supper added value. The interpretation of one sacrament would naturally affect the other. The point of importance for our study is that in the course of time the simple meal instituted by Jesus in commemoration of his death and celebrated as such by the early Christian church became an elaborate rite with Semitic, Greek, Mithraic, and doubtless other elements in it. The simple rite and the public teaching of the early church have given way to mysteries and "doctrines which must not be declared in the hearing of the uninitiated."⁴¹

Hatch gives the following description of the Eucharist taken from Dionysius Areopagites:

"All other initiations are incomplete without this. The consummation and crown of all the rest is the participation of him who is initiated in the thearchic mysteries. For though it be the common characteristic of all the hierarchic acts to make the initiated partakers of the divine light, yet this alone imparted to me the vision through whose mystic light, as it were, I am guided to the contemplation of the other sacred things." The ritual is then described. The sacred bread and the cup of blessing are placed upon the altar. "Then the sacred hierarch initiates the sacred prayer and announces to all the holy place: and after all have saluted each other, the mystic recital of the sacred lists is completed. The hierarch and the priests wash their hands in water; he stands in the midst of the divine altar, and around him stand the priests and the chosen ministers. The hierarch sings the praises of the divine working and consecrates the most divine mysteries, and by means of the symbols which are sacredly set forth, he brings into open vision the things of which he sings the praises. And when he has shown the gifts of the divine working, he himself comes into a sacred communion with them, and then invites the rest. And having both partaken and given to the others a share in the thearchic communion, he ends with a sacred thanksgiving; and while the people bend over what are divine symbols only, he himself, always by the thearchic-spirit, is led in a priestly manner, in purity of his godlike frame of mind, through blessed and spiritual contemplation,⁴² to the holy realities of the mysteries."⁴³

⁴⁰ J. A. Magni, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

⁴¹ Hatch, *op. cit.*, p. 293.

⁴² Due doubtless to neo-Platonic influence.

⁴³ Hatch, *op. cit.*, pp. 303 f. His description is taken from Dionysius Areopagites, *Eccles. Hier. C.* 3, par. 1, §§ 1, 2, pp. 187 f.

Such a profound change in a simple ritual is explicable only on the ground that the underlying social consciousness has changed. If our thesis is correct, the change in the rite is due to the change in the social consciousness, and without the latter the former would not have taken place.

We shall not attempt to describe all the changes through which the Lord's Supper has passed, but a few more may perhaps be mentioned with profit. It is clear from the description given above that the celebration of the Eucharist was becoming a more and more sacred matter. The bread and the cup were gradually becoming more mysterious. An emotional value attached to them which was sure to find overt expression. The simple meal instituted by Jesus which every one of his disciples could celebrate was invested with such sanctity, abstracted so far from its original purpose, and so altered in form, that some profound change in doctrine was inevitable. The consciousness of the group with reference to the eucharistic act was undergoing a gradual change. The reason for this is to be sought not only in the first contact with Greek and Roman culture, but also in the later influence of the Barbarian invasion and the spread of Christianity over Northern Europe. The outcome of the situation was the dogma of transubstantiation.

The term was first used by Hildebert of Tours. In the *Decretum Gratiani* (about 1150), it was adopted in full, and the fourth Council of Lateran declared it an article of faith. According to the doctrine of transubstantiation, the bread and the cup were no longer mere symbols of the body and blood of Christ. Once consecrated, they were the body and the blood of Christ. They were believed to exert a mysterious influence upon him who ate them. We have here a reversion to a most primitive conception—the eating of the god in order to become possessed of his virtues, or in other words communion through eating of the deity. The underlying idea is no less naïve than that at the root of the primitive Semitic sacrifice. In so far as this view is held by individuals of the present day, it indicates now, as it did then, a survival or recrudescence of a primitive social consciousness.

That such a crude conception would continue to exist in the long run without being challenged is inconceivable, especially in an age in which men were philosophizing on all sorts of problems. Subtle questions soon arose, such for instance as, "Do animals partake of the body of Christ when they swallow the consecrated host?" Such discussions were but foreboding what was to follow.

The Reformation brought men face to face with the irrationality of the doctrine of transubstantiation, and resulted in a general reconstruction of religious concepts. New foundations were laid. The Continental reformers were of one mind in repudiating the Roman doctrine of transubstantiation. They were not agreed among themselves as to what interpretation should be given, but they were certain that the pretended transubstantiation immediately after the *Epiclesis* did not actually take place. The Reformation, by its emphasis on freedom from the Roman hierarchy, gave a great stimulus to the rationalization of religion and morals. The simplification of the elaborate ritual of the Roman Catholic church was one of its immediate effects. This return to greater simplicity shows clearly that the idea which the Roman Catholic has of God is quite different from that of the so-called Protestant. A good Catholic cannot become a thorough Protestant without undergoing a profound change of social consciousness and vice versa.

During the past few hundred years great advance has been made in science, with the result that many old beliefs have been overthrown and replaced by modern concepts. The science of bacteriology has modified to a great extent the conception of the mutual relation between man and man. With the discovery of the fact that infectious diseases are readily transmitted from individual to individual through bacilli of various kinds, the Lord's Supper has become a recognized source of danger. As a result, the common cup has been superseded by the individual cup, except in places where the group has not awakened to the situation.

The danger of infection alone has kept many from the Lord's Supper. When to this we add the effect of the scientific attitude in dispelling naïveté and superstition, we realize that this rite can be preserved in the face of such facts only by giving it an interpretation in higher social terms. Of course, in groups that are still living on the old plane the old rite will continue to exist in the old manner. The *sine qua non* of further development is a real change in the social consciousness.

Herewith we close the discussion of the development of ritualism. The various rituals are the result of man's efforts to meet the elemental needs of life. They have their origin in some incident or crisis. The successful act becomes group habit, and thereby ceremony. Development takes place only with the changing social consciousness of the group concerned. Of this latter fact the present chapter has given ample evidence.

PART III

SURVIVAL OF RITUALISM

"After all, the kind of world one carries about in one's self is the important thing, and the world outside takes all its grace, color and value from that."--
JAMES RUSSELL LOWELL.

CHAPTER VIII

THE SURVIVAL OF THE CEREMONY

In tracing the development of ritualism we came to the conclusion that changes in the ritual are dependent upon changes within the social consciousness, and that without changes in the social consciousness no profound changes in the ritual are possible. The survival of ritualism, then, speaking in a very general sense, is dependent upon keeping intact a type of social consciousness that finds the ritualistic reaction—a valuable method of control. To be more specific—just this is the object of the present chapter—the rituals survive because they meet the needs of the group and of the individuals of the group in a satisfactory way. In case they fail to mediate these results for the individual, he ceases to participate unless external factors are brought to bear upon him. Likewise in the case of the group, ceremonial performances that have lost their practical significance, though they may continue for a while through sheer force of habit, soon lose their vitality and fall away.

In contrast to primitive conditions, modern civilized society is so organized that considerable latitude is given to individuals. According to their own preferences they may affiliate themselves with the particular organizations that seem to them best adapted to meet their needs. In this the influence of previous training is powerfully operative through suggestion, but deliberate choice is also present as a factor. Groups with very primitive standards are not only progressively maintained in this way, but new ones are often formed. For example, the writer, in an investigation of the gift of tongues and related phenomena¹ found that the automatic experience called tongue-speaking became the basis of forming various affiliated groups in the city of Chicago.

The thing that seems practical to one individual may appear ludicrous to another. Methods that mediate adequate control in one group may utterly fail in another. In some individuals, the instinct of self-display becomes a tremendous practical interest. Anything that appeals to their egotism receives their support and

¹ Vide "The Gift of Tongues and Related Phenomena at the Present Day," *American Journal of Theology* (April, 1909).

most hearty indorsement. Decorations of gold, lace, and feathers, the uniform with flashing buttons, the music and march of the ritual are just the things they need. Without this display life would seem incomplete. In contrast to this, other persons glory in self-abasement. To the question of the baptism ritual, "Dost thou renounce the devil and all his works, the vain pomp and glory of the world with all covetous desires of the same, and the carnal desires of the flesh so that thou wilt not follow nor be led by them?"² they respond with a hearty, "I renounce them all." Individuals of this type consider display the very essence of evil. They prefer rituals which apply rigorous tests of self-abasement. The writer has known of cases in which individuals have not stopped short of having a hole made through ice nearly two feet thick and of being immersed in a lake of ice-water in the dead of winter. The point that needs emphasis is that the social consciousness varies with different groups, and that modern life has present in it not only the conservative factors of social heredity, group education and training so powerful among savages, but the additional possibility of choice between various groups. In this way modern society has room both for the continuance of old ceremonies and for the survival of ritualism in new—some better and some more poorly adapted—cults. Practicality is, withal, the key word to the situation. The ritual that has lost its vitality cannot survive. When the group apperceives its inanity, it is discarded. This may take place in a cataclysmic way, but more commonly, owing to the power of habit, it is a gradual process.

The rituals may also lose of their vitality through the differentiation of elements which have acquired values in their own right. Two obvious examples of this are decorations and music. In primitive man's rituals they were vital to the ceremony and represented no value in and of themselves. They did not arise to satisfy an already existing love of beauty but were an essential factor in practical control. Art production was prior to art appreciation, and was its cause rather than its effect.³ Since the totemic ceremonies of the Central Australians are probably as primitive as any now extant, they are especially adapted to illustrate the point. The

² *The Doctrines and Discipline of the Methodist Episcopal Church*, 1908 (New York, 1908).

³ James Hayden Tufts, *On the Genesis of the Aesthetic Categories* (The University of Chicago Press, 1902), p. 6.

decorations employed in these instances, as we have shown in the first chapter, represent situations out of the lives of the natives and are introduced into the ceremony from practical motives. The decorations and the ceremony grow up together. Decorations are valuable because they are a part of the ceremony, and are not produced from sheer love of the beautiful. In so far as every activity of primitive life was ritualized, we are justified in saying that decorative art had no real place in life apart from the ceremony. The same is true in the case of music. The chant of the Unjiamba Totem Intichiuma ceremony was simply "a reiterated invitation to the Unjiamba tree to flower much, and to the blossoms to be full of honey."⁴ The music (in genesis at least) here is also a part of the ceremony and has value only as having a place in practical control.

When, however, decorative art and music are appreciated *qua* decorations and music, when they begin to have a value independent of the ceremony, when the group or the individuals of the group enjoy them and produce them apart from the ceremony, the way is opened for their separation from the ritual and for progressive development in their own right. Their value is no longer immediate and essential to the very upkeep of life. It has become highly idealized and occupies a field of its own.

At this point the question is *à propos* as to whether modern rituals survive by virtue of the fact that they have reabsorbed or developed aesthetic values of recognized quality in sufficient number. In that case the value of the ceremony would have shifted from the realm of the practical to that of the distinctively aesthetic, and the group would attend the performance of the ceremony—High Mass, for instance, or the Lord's Supper in any evangelical church—from motives similar to those from which it attends a concert or a drama. We are not inquiring as to whether the aesthetic experience has a place in ritualistic observances. Miss Adams has shown that, if human experience be regarded as "a continuous series of attempted or achieved modes of control of behavior," the feeling of satisfaction that accompanies attempted control and the "pause of satisfaction" that marks achieved control constitute the essence of the aesthetic experience.⁵ Since, as we have repeatedly

⁴ *The Native Tribes of Central Australia*, p. 181.

⁵ Elizabeth Kemper Adams, *The Aesthetic Experience: Its Meaning in a Functional Psychology* (The University of Chicago Press, 1907).

pointed out, the rituals are methods of controlling human experience, it is obvious that in the larger sense of the word the aesthetic experience is a concomitant of successful participation in the ritualistic act. The rite is performed; control is achieved; the participants rest satisfied.

The real question is: Do any modern rituals survive, not because they are thought to be practical, but solely because of the aesthetic experience accompanying their performance? To the writer the evidence so far collected by scholars, and the observations made by himself, seem to indicate that religious ceremonies are performed and services attended not primarily for the aesthetic effect, but largely from practical motives. The aesthetic may strengthen the appreciation of the practical, but the energizing impulses are, as of old, the instinctive tendencies to maintain life, though, of course, with greater elaboration and idealization.⁶ "There is developing a consciousness within whole nations and within mankind as a world-wide family and brotherhood, the inner, controlling motive of which is the elemental craving for life, but for a life richer and fuller and longer, in which all men everywhere may share."⁷ Such a type of consciousness may well appear, though not necessarily universally, in the modern religious ceremony. But this implies that the ritual is still considered a practical method of control.

Hylan's investigation by means of two questionnaires has produced results in substantial harmony with our conclusions on the point. He writes as follows:

Combining the answers to both questionnaires, the reasons for going [to church] were as follows: Personal good was mentioned 173 times; duty 140; example 77; habit 67; because of enjoyment 30; church society 14; because normal function 10; for music 10; fellowship 8; to keep alive religiously 5; rest 4; because it is the proper thing 4; for variety 4; to learn 3; love of God 3; expected to go 3; opportunity for service 2. . . .

It would be safe therefore to say that, according to these answers, the feeling of moral responsibility gives the strongest impulse to worship, and that the hope of resulting good to one's self or others is the most tangible reason.⁸

⁶ Edward Scribner Ames, "The Psychological Basis of Religion," *Monist*, XX (No. 2), 254.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 262.

⁸ John P. Hylan, *Public Worship* (Chicago, 1901), pp. 46 f.

As the persons who submitted answers to Hylan's questionnaire belonged to the Presbyterian, Methodist, Baptist, Episcopalian, Congregational, Roman Catholic, Dutch Reformed, Universalist, Christian, Lutheran, and a few other denominations,⁹ and only a small number had no creed, we may infer that some type of ritualism (not the same, of course) was pretty generally represented. A glance at the reasons for attendance at worship and figures representing answers given shows that Hylan is entirely correct in his estimate that the desire for good to oneself and to others is the most tangible reason for going to church; and, we may add, for religious practices generally, including ceremonies. While doubtless certain individuals, especially in isolated rural communities, attend services merely for the sake of enjoyment—that is, for aesthetic effect—the number is so small that it does not seem probable that they would keep up the rituals; and the more as this type of consciousness seeks variety rather than the uniformity of ritual.

James H. Leuba's investigation on "The Contents of Religious Consciousness"¹⁰ also brought results confirmatory of our thesis. The inquiry was made by means of a questionnaire sent to Protestant Anglo-Saxons. Some of the questions inquired into the reasons for religious practices. They thus covered a wider field than mere ritualistic practices, but necessarily also included the latter. Out of the replies received, Leuba felt himself justified in drawing the conclusion that "life, more life, a larger, richer, more satisfying life," was the real thing sought in religion. His correspondents testified that they used God. "*He is used*," writes Leuba, "used a good deal and with an admirable disregard of logical consistency, sometimes as meat purveyor, sometimes as moral support, sometimes as friend, sometimes as an object of love."¹¹

To the above we may without any hesitation add that if Leuba found this true of Protestants, it is at least to the same degree true of Catholics. The devout Catholic does not attend mass specifically for the aesthetic effect. He is looking for something that will be of practical benefit to him. He wishes to make use of his God. His everything depends upon being on good terms with him. An incident in striking corroboration of this was related to the writer by

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 12 f.

¹⁰ James H. Leuba, "The Contents of Religious Consciousness," *Monist*, XI, 536-73.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 571.

one of the deputy sheriffs of Cook County, Illinois. An Italian Catholic had murdered a Swede and was arrested by the deputy sheriff. On the way to the jail he asserted with great confidence that his God would help him in his trouble and prevent his being hanged. In return for more or less faithful observance of the ritual he expected the deity to deliver him out of his difficulty.

What is true of church ceremonies holds also with reference to those of modern fraternal organizations. The pronounced object of such associations is the nurture of more intimate fellowship and the rendering of mutual assistance in time of need. They are not organizations primarily in the interest of so-called play-activities or for aesthetic enjoyment. Men and women join them largely from practical motives. Witness, for instance, the insurance interests connected with some of the orders, the motto, "Friendship, Love and Truth," of one that is very popular, and the promise of mutual help in time of trouble common to most, if not all, of them. The initiation ceremony and other rituals connected with them survive because they are found to be a practical method of controlling certain aspects of the order. The profound emotional effect produced upon the neophytes continues to be an important factor in the conservation and development of group loyalty.

We have shown that elements which in the first place existed in the ritual in an undifferentiated state may become differentiated and exist in their own right; and that in so far as they represent distinct values of their own they tend to disintegrate the ritual. It was in this way that the aesthetic categories were generated. We found reason to conclude with reference to music and decorative art of various kinds—and the same doubtless holds true of art in general—that they are not the chief end sought by the group in modern rituals, but that, as of old, practical motives come first.

But our real problem still remains before us. In the sixth chapter we took the stand that the emergence of the scientific attitude, the recognized emphasis upon individual experience, and the attempt to socialize the world of social objects completely also tend to destroy the value of the ritual—that is to say, make it appear as an ineffective medium of practical control. In the face of the fact that the above-mentioned elements may be said to be characteristic of modern civilization, why does the ritual continue to play so large a part in the life of certain groups? We may answer, Because the type of social consciousness continues which

evaluates it highly. But that leaves the matter entirely too general. Or we may say that the ritual continues because it seems practical. But that is superficial psychology. To answer the question of the survival of the ceremony in addition to showing the above, we must probe deeper into the psychology of evaluation.

To begin with, we need constantly to keep in mind that the ritualistic attitude is an aspect of the normal functioning of human life. It represents a tendency to fall back on habit. We have abundantly shown this in the case of primitive man, but it is equally applicable to higher stages of culture. Extemporaneous prayer, which, as is well known, is to take the place of the form prescribed in liturgical churches, is itself in constant danger of following definite grooves. The individual, through frequent repetition, becomes familiar with a particular sequence of thought and says his prayer as automatically as though he were reading it out of a prayer-book for the thousandth time. The churches that started out with a lively protest against the dead ritual of the liturgical churches have manifested a constant tendency to adopt definite forms of worship. We may with propriety speak of the ritual of non-liturgical churches. The members of the worshiping group think it strange when the regular order of service is not adhered to. They expect the singing of hymns, the prayer, the anthem by the choir, the announcements, the sermon, and whatsoever else there may be, to follow the habitual order and adhere to customary usages. Strange though it may appear, revivalism itself has been ritualized. In camp-meetings and revival meetings the methods and arrangement of services are the same year after year, and the group consciousness that is developed at these gatherings is no less in evidence than in primitive man's great ceremonial occasions.

Whenever a change is to take place in habitual conduct, the odds are on the side of habit. The formation of new habits involves the opening of new nerve pathways. Since the rituals are very largely controlled by individuals who are past those years when habits are most easily broken and new ones most readily formed, it follows that here we have an especially difficult situation to change. The complexity of the problem is but increased by the fact that those to whom the care of the ritual is given in each succeeding generation are properly constituted conservatives. In this way a particular type of social consciousness is progressively con-

served in the midst of a thousand and one changing conditions. The technique involved is of such a nature that it is next to impossible for the scientific attitude, the recognition of the value of individual experience, and a desire for a complete socialization of the deity to take hold of the group. When they appear to be making inroads, the conservatives are ever ready to give a warning signal and bid halt.

This brings us face to face with a point of first significance in the study of the psychology of value. The self is always characterized by an emotional content. There may be cognitive and conative elements present in varying degrees, but the core is always emotional. This means that in last analysis the self in each particular instance must be identified with an emotion. The emotion is the ultimate court of reference. When the individual says, "My," with any consciousness an emotion is always present. But not only is the emotional aspect important in the self; emotional elements constitute the stuff out of which the social objects of the individual are constructed. In a given group of individuals, any particular individual's consciousness of himself is at bottom emotional, and all the members of his group are built up by him out of affective elements in his consciousness. What holds true of any individuals of the group holds true of the group as a whole. The consciousness which an individual has of his own country, or his own family, is characterized by an entirely different content from that of any other country or any other family. There is a warmth, an intimacy present in the former that is lacking in the latter. It is a well-known fact of social psychology that the individual when conscious of other groups tends to identify himself with the interests of his own. The uninvited outsider who attempts to mediate in a group quarrel is always in danger of having the entire group turn upon him. The social self of any member of a group is essentially the emotional content that gathers about himself in his various relations to the members of his group. Those are the conditions which made possible the almost indefinite extension of the blood feud in primitive society. The outsider who had injured any member of another group thereby had irretrievably injured that group, and at the same time had involved his entire group in the situation. At the present time this emotional character of the social self is at the root of patriotism, loyalty, love, class spirit, social reform, and numerous other social phenomena. Any indi-

vidual or group that injures any member of the group with which a particular individual has identified himself, or disturbs any of the interests of his group, *ipso facto* injures the individual himself.

For the psychology of evaluation this has the significance that in determining the value of anything the ultimate court of appeal is invariably the emotional consciousness aroused by the situation.¹² Intermediate processes frequently intervene before the end is realized, but they will not be set in operation until the court of emotional consciousness has rendered a decision in favor of proceeding. The economic value may be stated in dollars and cents, and thus has the advantage over the immediate statement in terms of emotion in that it is capable of exact measurement. Moreover, it may represent the means whereby that which is valuable may be procured. As a matter of last resort, however, that which is valuable from the economic point of view has value only by virtue of the emotional consciousness it arouses. In evidence of this, witness the fall of prices on old styles when the fashion changes.

The place of the emotional consciousness in the survival of ritualism is admirably illustrated in the sacrament called the Lord's Supper. A careful study of this ritual according to the forms used in the Episcopal and the Methodist Episcopal churches will not fail to bring out the fact that the ceremony serves the consciousness of both worshipers and deity. It is arranged on a social basis. The *ego* is the worshiper; the *alteri* are the deity and the other members of the group. The sacramental service mediates proper control when it reinforces or reinstates a proper friendly relationship between the *ego* and the *alteri* and an assurance of mutual helpfulness.

From this point of view it is after all not so different from the primitive common meal sacrifice; for here, too, the object was the renewal of friendly relationship between the various members of the group and the deity. There is actual parallelism between lower and higher stages of culture in the matter of elemental needs.¹³ The situation is one that depends very largely upon the emotions aroused. If we assume that conditions which produce peace are desirable, it is obvious that this sacrament must be of great value to many individuals in a disquieted and fearful mental condition.

¹² For a view similar to the one taken here *vide* Wilbur Marshall Urban, *Valuation: Its Nature and Laws* (London, 1909).

¹³ Ernest Pauli, *The Tree of Life* (London, 1905), pp. 260 f.

They come out of the service assured that since all is well between them and their God, and between them and their fellow-men, their welfare in the future is certain. It is in this direction that we must look for reasons for its survival.

A description of the ceremony according to the ritual used by the Methodist Episcopal church will add force to the above.¹⁴ On the appointed day and place, the elder standing before his congregation reads several sentences from the Bible, of which the following will serve as illustration:

Let your light so shine before men, that they may see your good works, and glorify your father which is in heaven (Matt. 5:16).

Not every one that saith unto me Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven; but he that doeth the will of my Father which is in heaven (Matt. 7:21).

Whoso hath this world's good, and seeth his brother have need, and shutteth up his bowels of compassion from him, how dwelleth the love of God in him? (I John 3:17).

These verses tend to bring out the relation of the worshiper to the deity and to his fellow-men. The effect is but heightened when the elder asks the congregation to stand and solemnly reads the invitation,

If any man sin we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous. . . .

Wherefore ye that do truly and earnestly repent of your sins, and are in love and charity with your neighbors and intend to lead a new life, following the commandments of God, and walking from henceforth in his holy ways, draw near with faith, and take this Holy Sacrament to your comfort, and devoutly kneeling, make your humble confession to Almighty God.¹⁵

By this time the dualism of the *ego* and the *alter* is complete. The later stands sharply defined over against the former. The *ego* is the sinner and must be reconciled to the *alter*. The confession follows. The worshiper acknowledges and bewails his manifold sins and wickedness, and calls upon God to have mercy upon him. If he is taking real part in the ceremony, he is borne along on a wave of deep emotion. Now it is that the person and office of Jesus are introduced with telling effect. The elder offers the

¹⁴ *Methodist Discipline* (1908), pp. 363 f.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 365 f.

prayer of consecration. The bread and wine before him on the table are consecrated in remembrance of the death and passion of Jesus, so that the worshiper in receiving them may be partaker "of his most blessed body and blood."

Following the consecration, the worshipers are invited to the altar. Devoutly kneeling, they receive the bread from the elder, while he solemnly says:

The body of our Lord Jesus Christ which was given for thee, preserve thy soul and body unto everlasting life. Take and eat this in remembrance that Christ died for thee, and feed on him in thy heart by faith, with thanksgiving.

A similar formula is repeated by the elder while the worshipers drink of the wine.

By these formal acts, which have direct reference to the sacred history of the group, the worshiper is brought into the closest relation to the deity, and is completely reinstated in his favor. It has been a real communion, in which the members of his group have participated with him. They are brothers in the same household, with God as their father, and therefore all is well. The worshiper goes on his way rejoicing.

The rituals represent group habits. They are the group's favorite way of reacting under given conditions. The sacred history of the group often finds expression through them. They constitute some of the chief interests of the group concerned, and are believed to be methods of practical control. In fact, they may prove to be very practical, as we have just seen, not only in controlling the group as a whole, but in meeting certain needs of the individuals themselves. Who will undertake to estimate the power of habit and of suggestion on human life? The "sick soul" readily finds the ritual, which has proven so efficacious a medium of relief in its own group, an acceptable and efficient method of cure for itself. The more abrupt and striking the incursion from the subconsciousness into the focus of attention, the more practical and wonderful it appears. It is not at all vital that it should subserve the original purpose.

These sacred and time-hallowed rituals correspond to attitudes common to the group. They are positive elements in the social consciousness of its members. Their conservation is a source of no small pleasure, and their disintegration scarcely dreamed of.

Whenever a situation arises that threatens their survival, they are at once referred to the court of final appeal of all that is valuable, the affective consciousness. If that decides for their upkeep, and of course it usually does, the battle between conservatism and liberalism is on.

It is probably through some such explanation as this that we must account for the survival of the elaborate war-dance of the Iroquois Indians.¹⁶ To the observer it may appear to be merely play; but for the group itself it is more than play. Morgan cites the following speech made by O-nó-sä during the war-dance, which will serve to illustrate the point:

Friends and Relatives—We have reason to glory in the achievements of our ancestors. I behold with sadness the present declining state of our noble race. Once the warlike yell and the painted band were the terror of the white man. Then our fathers were strong and their power was felt and acknowledged far and wide over the American continent. But we have been reduced and broken by the cunning and rapacity of the white-skinned race. We are now compelled to crave as a blessing, that we may be allowed to live upon our own lands, to cultivate our own fields, to drink from our own springs, and to mingle our bones with those of our fathers. Many winters ago, our wise ancestors predicted that a great monster, with white eyes, would come from the east, and, as he advanced, would consume the land. This monster is the white race, and the prediction is near its fulfilment. They advised their children, when they became weak, to plant a tree with four roots, branching to the north, the south, the east, and the west; and then collecting under its shade to dwell together in unity and harmony. This tree, I propose, shall be this very spot. Here we will gather, here live, and here die.¹⁷

This and other dances of the Indians bring to the surface a remarkable group enthusiasm. They make the particular group stand out in sharp contrast to all the others. They knit the members of the group more closely together, and give to the group courage and solidarity. The Indian feels that he is still in the lineage of his noble ancestry. One could scarcely conceive of a more powerful appeal to the emotions than this. Morgan mentions a mourning council of the Iroquois held at Tonawanda in October, 1846, to raise up sachems. About six hundred Iroquois were in attendance. On the second day the Great Feather dance was

¹⁶ Lewis H. Morgan, *League of the Iroquois* (New York, 1904), chap. iv.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 266 f.

performed by a select group. The enthusiasm of the group knew no bounds. "It was remarked to Da-at'-ga-dose, an educated Onandago sachem, that they would be Indians forever, if they held to these dances. He replied, that he knew it, and for that reason he would be the last to give them up."¹⁸ It would be difficult to find a more apt illustration than this one. These Indians are keeping up their ceremonies because they think that the very life of the group depends upon them.

As long as the rituals take such a place in the life of the group, as long as they promote the group consciousness, conserve group values, and satisfy the needs of the individuals of the group, they will survive. As such they may have highly idealized significance as compared with early immediate reference; yet they remain instruments of practical control. And it is just because the group continues to realize these values (in varying proportion, of course) that old rituals subsist in the midst of modern environment.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 251 f. (footnote).

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